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EFFECT OF QUALIFYING LISTING LANGUAGE ON
REAL ESTATE BROKERS' COMMISSIONS;
OBLIGATION OF A LISTING PROPERTY OWNER*
WILLIAM E. WALLACEt
I. INTRODUCTION
The line of demarcation between the principles applying to the
rights of a broker under a special contract and to his rights under
a general agreement is clear and distinct. In the absence of a
special contract, it is the general rule that a real estate broker is
entitled to his commission when he has procured a purchaser
ready, able and willing to purchase the property upon the
terms fixed by the owner. The parties, however, may by special
contract modify the general rule, and make the commission pay-
able dependent upon certain conditions or contingencies, and
when such stipulations are made, a fulfillment or performance of
the prescribed conditions is generally essential to the right to
compensation. The owner has a right to stipulate that he will not
pay, or be obligated in any way to pay, for services in relation to
the sale of his land, unless the prescribed conditions are fulfilled.,
This language, or its equivalent, has been repeated ad nuuseam by
the courts of nearly every state, apparently in the belief that it says
something on which subsequent conduct, lay as well as legal, can
safely be predicated. But, like all other legal maxims, it is superficial,
and leaves more unsaid than said. While each of the above quoted
sentences gives rise to a myriad of knotty problems, this analysis will
deal only with those raised by the making of a "special contract." 2
A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the School of Law of the University
of Michigan in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the S.J.D. degree.
t Assistant Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law.
1. Hensley v. Moretz, 90 S.E.2d 183, 186 (Va. 1955). See note 140 infra.
2. Many of the problems relating to "unqualified" or "general" brokerage list-
ings are discussed in WALLACE, REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE CONTRACTS (unpublished
thesis in Univ. of Michigan Law Library) and a discussion of some of the prob-
lems is presented in Wallace, Promissory Liability Under Real Estate Brokerage
C,,tjf Ocf, 37 IowA L. REV. 350 (1952).
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What is such a "special contract"? While the term is also commonly
used to refer to a listing in which the broker's undertaking is specified
in terms other than the "ready, willing and able" of the general list-
ing, for example, where the requirement is "to consummate a sale,"
for the purposes of this discussion "special contract" has reference to
an agreement in which the provision for payment of the commission
is placed with other language in the listing agreement having refer-
ence to some outside event, as for example, "when the property is
sold" or "when title passes," unless the discussion herein specifically
indicates otherwise. 3 As the article progresses the effect of specific
language referring to the payment of commissions will be considered.
Will or should the making of such a "special contract ' 4 always, in
the words of the Virginia court quoted above, make the commission
"dependent upon certain conditions or contingencies"? There have
been two major rationales used in determining the meaning and effect
of the use of such provisions- (1) typified by the language of the
Virginia court quoted above, that there is provided a "condition prece-
dent" to the payment of commissions, and (2) that the provision
merely states a "time" at which a commission, earned under the gen-
eral brokerage provisions, is to be paid. Are these two rationales
mutually exclusive so that should a court utilize one in a given case in
which qualifying language was used in the brokerage agreement it
must adopt the same rationale in all cases involving similar language?
Is the language employed the only determinative factor? An approach
providing an affirmative answer to the first of these questions is to be
found in most cases where the undertaking required of the broker by
the offer of the listing owner is something more than mere production
of a purchaser, ready, willing and able. But that such need not and
should not be the case where such language is to be found only in a
clause relating to payment of commissions should be evident from the
following discussion. As for the second question, cases have arisen in
which, because of the existence of different factual circumstances sur-
rounding the brokerage provision, hardship would be imposed upon a
party should the court mechanically follow its prior decisions in which
the same brokerage language had been used. More specifically, a court
about to issue a brokerage opinion must concern itself with such
questions as, what will be the social effects of a particular decision
which must of necessity be based on one interpretation to the exclu-
sion of the other? If a "time" interpretation is adopted in a particular
3. See, e.g., text at notes 31-37 infra.
4. Wallace, supra note 2. The courts refer to the listing agreement from its
inception as a "unilateral contract." This paper will make no further reference
to this matter of semantics, but will use the simple term "listing" or the phrase
"listing agreement" to refer to the property owner's offer unless reference is
being made to court treatment.
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case, will the intention of the landowner be frustrated if he does not,
without necessity of resort to legal action, receive the funds expected
from the transaction? Will landowners become the unwilling tools by
which one segment of our economy (the broker) is favored over an-
other? On the other hand, if a "condition precedent" rationale is
used, will the landowner be able to "play fast and loose" with a broker
-accepting the broker's services if he is so disposed, rejecting them
if he has "changed his mind" about the advisability of the transac-
tion? Will the landowner be placed in an unduly favorable position?
Is the fact that the broker, in dealing with the average landowner, is
infinitely better equipped to secure advantageous brokerage provisions
because of experience and training a proper consideration? What
cowsideration should flow from the fact that it is usually the broker
who prepares any written memorandum of the transaction?
It is submitted that an understanding of the analytical problems in-
volved, of the consequences of acceptance of one of the rationales to
the exclusion of the other in similar, yet different, cases, and of the
court's behavior when confronted by the presence of such qualifying
language, will best be developed by a study of the decisions of the
courts of the two jurisdictions most widely credited with embracing
ozi- or the other of the rationales in brokerage cases-New Jersey
("time"), and New York ("condition precedent").
It is recognized that courts purport to ascertain the intention of the
parties and that either rationale may be overdone. Further, there is
often no "mutual" intent in fact, the realty owner intending to pay no
(',nmiskion until he has received the purchase money, the broker ex-
pecting, compensation for finding a purchaser accepted by the owner.5
A broker, being considered a fiduciary by most courts, owes his em-
ployer (the landowner) the fidelity consistent with such a status; con-
siderltions affecting matters of liability where a broker violates his
attendant duty are outside the scope of this paper.6 On the other
hand, considerations involved in the handling of cases where the
owner has been at fault in the defeat of a transaction, or where the
owner has secured an "equivalent" performance, are pertinent to a
full understanding of the effect of the adoption of one or the other
of the rationales in a specific case. Therefore, such considerations will
be discussed herein.1
a, This statement is based upon the conflicting positions of the parties to liti-
gated cases dealing with situations in which the broker claims commission for
having found a "purchaser" although no money passes from such "purchaser" to
th listiing owner.
0. For consideration of this matter, see 2 MCHSwI AGSNOY §§ 410-7 (2d ed.
1914).
7. See text at notes 107-26 infra. See also §§ II (b), IV (b) iafra.
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II. NEW JERSEY
Cases from New Jersey have been selected for the beginning dis-
cussion because they are, quite erroneously as we shall see, commonly
accepted as unique in the utilization of a "time" rationale where pay-
ment provisions of the type to be discussed herein are employed. As
a result, an understanding of its decisions and the reasons therefor
would best seem to present the problems with which this article deals.
That the New Jersey approach has not been restricted to the "time"
rationale is illustrated by the fact that its genesis is found in Hinds v.
Henry.8 In that case it was expressly recognized that a landowner and
a real estate broker could make a special agreement based on a con-
tingency. It was not until forty years later in Rauhwanger v. KCatzin 0
decided in 1912, that the New Jersey courts indicated that a qualifica-
tion of the apparent force of the Hinds decision was inherent in the
language of that opinion, and not until 1924, in Lehrhoff v. Schwart-
sky,10 that the court expressly enunciated the "time" rationale. Since
the Lehrhoff decision New Jersey has utilized the "condition prece-
dent" interpretation on occasion; the acceptance of one or the other
of the rationales depending upon the courts',, determination of the
intention of the parties"l--did they intend to state an absolute obliga-
tion to pay on the part of the property owner with the actual payment
postponed until the occurrence of an outside event (usually one which
would result in receipt of money by the property owner), or did they
intend to state a condition precedent to any obligation to pay on the
part of the property owner? While it will be obvious from the discus-
sion to follow that there is in New Jersey an overly strong judicial
preference for the "time" rationale, moderate employment of such a
preference would appear to produce more realistic results than is the
case where acceptance of a "condition precedent" rational has become
semi-automatic, as is the situation in many of the other jurisdictions.
Because of their long history of "condition" decisions, should these
other courts be willing to accept the same basic dual-rationale they
would probably be unwilling to match the strong "time" preference
demonstrated by the New Jersey decisions. However, a comparatively
liberal use of the "time" rationale would release such an adopting
8. 36 N.J.L. 328 (Sup. Ct. 1873).
9. 82 N.J.L. 339, 82 Atl. 510 (Sup. Ct. 1912).
10. 2 N.J. Misc. 353, 125 Atl. 496 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
11. Whether particular listing language creates a condition precedent to pay-
ment of a commission or merely states a time at which it is to be paid is a matter
of law. Roe v. Eggleston, 6 N.J. Misc. 630, 142 Atl. 366 (Sup. Ct. 1928). See
Doe v. Eggleston, 106 N.J.L. 565, 146 Atl. 175 (Ct. Err. & App. 1929). Of. 3
ComIN, CONTRACTS §§ 554, 639 (1951).
12. E.g., with Winter v. Toldt, 32 N.J. Super. 443, 108 A.2d 648 (App. Div.
1954) compare Alnor Constr. Co. v. Herchet, 10 N.J. 246, 90 A.2d 14 (Sup. Ct.
1952).
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court from an otherwise "anti-broker"1 construction, and at the same
time eliminate the extremes to which over-indulgence in a 'time" in-
terpretation may lead.
(a) Qualifying Brokerage Language
1. Payable.
For the purpose of this paper, the most important brokerage lan-
guage, interpretation-wise, considered by the New Jersey courts has
been that involving phrases dealing with some form of the term "pay,"
sometimes with, sometimes without, accompanying qualifying lan-
guage. Of these provisions, those stating simply that the commission
is payable at a certain date or upon the happening of a certain event
form the basic nucleus of decisional determination and it is here that
an acceptance of one or the other of the rationales, depending upon
the "intention" of the parties, assumes major importance.
Hinds v. Henry involved an acknowledgment by the owner of real
estate that a debt was owed to a broker for services rendered in secur-
ing a "sale" of certain property. It also contained a provision for part
payment of such debt "at the time that.., the first half of the pur-
chase money" was paid, "the balance at the expiration of one year
from the date of the deed." The supreme court, treating the provision
as requiring the broker to plead either the occurrence of the condition
or its defeat through the "willful or fraudulent" acts of the owner,
found that a "condition precedent" had been stated. But, in Rauoh-
ira uger 7. Katzin,"' which permitted a broker to recover a commission,
that court explained the Hinds rule as "not intended to work injustice
by putting it within the power of a vendor after the agent has fulfilled
hie'i par of the contract to postpone indefinitely the day of setlement,
and therefore deprive the agent of the fruits of his labor... ."1 Italics
have been added to signify decisional language that may indicate
adoption of a "time" rationale, which accords with later New Jersey
interpretation of this case- However, such was not specifically stated
and the Rauch wanger decision could be construed to mean merely that
13. Thbis "semi-hostile" term is not to be found in any decision-the usual lan-
guag'e is that, in accordance with general contract principles, the listing contract
is tx be ccnstrued most strongly against the maker (almost always the broker);
hut the degree to which such "construction" has gone leads me to adopt a term
that connotes something more than does the pure, dispassionate canon employed
by the c rurts.
14. 82 N.J.L. 339, 82 A. 510 (Sup. Ct. 1912).
I-. IP. at 340-41, 82 Atl. at 510. But Hinds v. Henry involved an "acknowledg-
ment" that the property owner had become indebted to the broker for brokerage
servikeq. Would not that ground the conclusion that the Hinds court was allow-
ing the omer to "deprive the agent of the fruits of his labor" "after the agent
[had] fulfilled his part of the contract"? Compare text supported by notes 26-30
in f r.
16. See, c.g., Leschziner v. Bauman, 83 N.J.L. 743, 85 Atl. 205 (Ct. Err. &
Apr. 1912).
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a capricious refusal of the owner to coniplete the transaction (his wife
had objected to the transaction and he had demanded that the broker
reduce his commission claim) would come within the "willful or
fraudulent" acts of an owner that would excuse proof of the happen-
ing of the condition within the Hinds decision. 17
Any conclusion that the Rauchwanger decision was an unrestrained
victory for the real estate broker was destined to be short-lived. Only
nine months later the court of errors and appeals in Leschziner v.
Bauman,' adopted the Hinds rationale and distinguished the Rauch-
wanger decision with the comment that in that case the broker had
undeniably earned his commission and that he was merely allowing
the owner to fix the date for its payment while the provision before
the court at this time clearly conditioned payment of the commission.
And, in discussing the applicability of the Hinds rule, the court said
that "In varying phases of fact it has been followed or distinguished,
as the reason of the rule would seem to warrant."19 Thus, we have the
highest court of New Jersey indicating that it did not intend to be
bound by any one particular interpretation but would determine for
itself as the brokerage provision of each individual transaction came
before it whether that particular provision fell within or without the
"reason" of the Hinds rule. It was not until nine years later, in Lehr-
hoff v. Schwartsky,20 where the supreme court was confronted with a
listing providing for a commission "to be paid... on the date of clos-
ing title to said premises" that a New Jersey court expressly enunci-
ated the "time" rationale. Although the brokerage language was virtu-
ally identical with that which had been interpreted by the court of
errors and appeals in Leschziner v. Bauman to be conditional, the
supreme court now found the language referred only to time, although
recognizing that a condition precedent could be employed by the use of
appropriate language. 21 Following rendition of this opinion, decisions
employing the "time" rationale became numerous, and in Fieldman v.
Thomas,22 decided in 1931, the supreme court concluded that a pro-
vision for commission on the sale price "payable when title is passed"
referred to time of payment only. The substance of this provision
differed from the brokerage provision involved in the Leschziner
case only in a minor detail which, in a slightly different context, has
been considered as demanding an interpretation that the clause must
17. Hinds v. Henry, 36 N.J.L. 328, 333 (Sup. Ct. 1873).
18. 83 N.J.L. 743, 85 AtI. 205 (Ct. Err. & App. 1912).
19. Id. at 744, 85 AtI. at 205.
20. 2 N.J. Misc. 353, 125 AtI. 496 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
21. Id. at 354, 125 AtI. at 496%
22. 10 N.J. Misc. 48, 157 AtI. 554 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
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have reference to "time."- It therefore seems that a definite shift to
the "time" interpretation was well under way by the early thirties.
This trend was expressly recognized by the supreme court in For-
man o. Bedzinqster Land Co.;-" where that court, in dictum, discussed
the effect of clauses beginning with the term "payable." It was ac-
cepted that the "recent" New Jersey cases sustained the view that
such clauses merely provided the time for payment, notwithstanding
the fact that the cases so holding involved attempts by the property
owners to state conditions.; While the actual decision, based on some-
what different language the import of which will be discussed later,
found that a condition precedent was intended, the acknowledgment
of the then existing interpretation so favorable to the "time" rationale
-that such an interpretation would be indulged in notwithstanding
the fact that the property owner had clearly attempted to state a con-
dition precedent to his obligation to pay-seems peculiarly valuable to
an understanding of the post-1930 New Jersey decisions.
The appellate division of the superior court, in Richard v. Falleti,2
restated what seems to have become one crucial distinguishing feature
in the determination of whether a "condition" or a "time" clause is
present-viz., is there a "separate, unqualified agreement to pay" the
commission? But, although many opinions employing the "time"
rationale have contributed to the "time" trend, in none of the state-
ments of rationale has the New Jersey court alluded to what would
clearly seem to be two other legitimate distinguishing features present
in si,,te of the cases, viz., when was the brokerage agreement made
(was it prior to, contemporaneous with, or subsequent to, the enter-
ing of a contract between the property owner and purchaser), and
where was it found (a separate instrument or part of the agreement
between the owner and purchaser) ? There has been ample reference
to the existence of an "acknowledgment" in the brokerage agreement
that the commission has been earned. Does this, coupled with an ap-
parent eagerness to find such an "acknowledgement," evidence, an
appreciation of the fact that a brokerage provision referring to an ex-
ternal event, executed after the broker has performed, lacks consider-
ation to the extent necessary to make the event a "condition prece-
dent"? :7 This question is not to be interpreted as a statement that
2:'. The_ stating of a date in the brokerage provision involved in the Leschziner
cas(-"on the doy of passing title or July 15th." See Samuel R. Laden, Inc. V.
Lidgerwood Estate&s, Inc., 15 N.J. Misc. 498, 192 At. 425 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
24. 110 N.J.L. 1, 163 At]. 123 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
25. Id. at 2, 163 Atl. at 123. This, of course, lends content to the possibility
reconiized in the text at p. 299 o wpra, that the "time" rationale could be used
to improper extremes. Cf. note 13 .upra and text supported thereby.
20'. 13 N.J. Super. 534, 81 A.2d 17 (App. Div. 1951).
27. Ef -Yec Conclusion. Compare text supported by notes 103-06 infra.
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such is, or even might be, the sole significance of the "time" interpre-
tation.
The Richard decision did provide what is probably the most note-
worthy attempt to rationalize the alleged superiority of the "time"
rationale. After discussing the prior New Jersey "time" decisions, the
court considered them to "accord with the rule governing contracts
generally: Where a debt has arisen, liability will not be excused be-
cause, without fault of the creditor and due to happenings beyond his
control, the time for payment, as fixed by the contract, can never
arrive. Restatement, Contracts § 301; Williston, Contracts § 799;
*..-28 This, of course, is the accepted view in its legitimate setting,
but its use in this situation assumes the whole problem by the state-
ment "where a debt has arisen"-when and how and has such a debt
arisen? If the provision relating to commission states a condition
precedent to its payment no "debt" has arisen until that condition has
been satisfied by performance or legal excuse. 29
Thus, it will be noted that the "time" rationale rests upon an inter-
pretation either that a "separate, unqualified agreement to pay" the
commission exists, or that there is an "acknowledgment" that a com-
mission is owing. To forecast with reasonable accuracy the judicial
behavior likely to be excited by a particular brokerage provision re-
quires an informed consideration of the entire brokerage agreement,
with special emphasis on its language and internal construction, in
light of all the circumstances surrounding the transaction. There are
many considerations that should be pondered before a particular de-
cision is reached. Some of these are suggested at the end of the follow-
ing section. In the consideration of such questions only minor inter-
pretation aids applicable to the simple "when payable" provision can
be offered. The most obvious, of course, is the evinced preference for
a "time" rationale. The Richard court recognized that the distinctions
were fine, but blamed their use on the "ambiguous language used by
the parties in contracting." It would seem, however, that the New
Jersey courts have, as suggested above, overlooked what should be
considered critical aspects-those concerned with the location and
timing of enunciation of the brokerage provision. And it would seem
that an informed broker organization could develop a brokerage pro-
vision which would bring its members within the letter of the "fine"
distinction. Instead, other terms have been added which have caused
further problems of interpretation.
28. 13 N.J. Super. at 539, 81 A.2d at 19.
29. Compare the New York opinions to the effect that, although the commis-
sion may be earned, payment may be conditioned. See text at pp. 315-16 infra.
30. See text supported by pp. 307-10 infra.
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2. Due and payable.
An example of such an addition is the use of "due and," making the
commission provision read that the commission is "due and payable"
when a certain event occurs. In this simple form of the additional
language only two cases are to be found. In J. R. Tucker, Inc. v.
MalaffcY' 1 the commission agreement was executed after the property
owner and purchaser had entered a contract for sale of the property.
Without discussing a prior grant of authority referred to in the com-
mission agreement or what, if any, consideration had passed from the
owner to the broker at the time of enunciation of the brokerage pro-
vision, the court found that the agreement "in express terms recog-
nizes that the [broker] . .. earned its commission, and simply fixed
the date when payment shall become due."' ' 2 But had there been no
such recognition of a past debt, what would the result have been? In
W, onmr.\fey v. Nicosia the property owner agreed, in the proposed
agreement of sale between the property owner and purchaser, to pay
a commission "to be due and payable upon execution and delivery of
this agreement of sale." The transaction subsequently fell through.
In finding for the owner in this case, the court of errors and appeals
evidently considered that such delivery of the agreement was a condi-
tion precedent-especially is this likely in light of the fact that the
court took pains to emphasize that the owner was in no way at fault
in the failure of delivery.2 Thus, the two "due and payable" cases
resulted in the use of different rationales. On the surface, at least, it
would seem that this resulted from the presence of the acknowledg-
ment of an existing debt (the "crucial distinguishing feature" of
many cases determining whether a "time" clause or "condition prece-
dent" is present :) in the one case, and its absence from the other. In
the absence of such an acknowledgment, it would seem that there was
31. ; N.J. Misc. 17, 139 AtI. 806 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
32. Id. at 20, 139 Atl. at 806-07.
3. 135 N.J.L. 452, 52 A.2d 530 (Ct. Err. & App. 1947).
34. Only by finding a condition precedent would the question of "whose fault"
it was that there was no "delivery" be material. See text supported by notes
71-73 infro.
35. See text supported by notes 26-27 supra. In Marschalk v. Weber, 11 N.J.
Super. 16, 77 A.2d 505 (App. Div. 1950) the commission clause provided: "Com-
mission.., shall be earned when agreement of sale executed .... said commission
shall not be payable until the deed is delivered and the purchase price is paid
in full when the same shall be due and payable." It is to be regretted that the
then newly formed appellate division was not presented squarely with the problem
of the effect of such a provision, for it involved a kind of "hybrid" language.
There was no acknowledgement of an existing debt, but the opening clause made
provision for the earning of the commission when the agreement of sale was
executed, while the closing clause stated that the commission was not due and
payable "until the deed is delivered and the purchase price is paid." Compare
the discussion at text supported by notes 41-42 inf ra.
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nothing "due"3 the broker until and unless the stated event had oc-
curred. Moreover, the fact that the Tucker decision involved a situa-
tion where the broker had clearly performed the undertaking required
prior to statement of the brokerage provision, whereas the provision
involved in the Womersley case had been executed prior to any author-
ized activity by the broker, must not be overlooked.3 7
Most of the decisions involving the "due and payable" language
have involved listings in which the broker's undertaking was some-
thing more than simply finding a purchaser ready, willing and able.
When confronted with such a situation, the courts have been asked to
focus their attention on the undertaking separated from the "when
payable" clause. Therefore, clarity demands that some attention be
paid to the jural effect given to the term most often employed in such
an agreement--"consummate"-the purpose being to provide an un-
derstanding of how the courts act in this somewhat different situation.
In interpreting the term "consummation" as used in listing agree-
ments generally, the New Jersey courts have "played the intention"
of the parties to a high degree. Thus, in two cases in which the
brokerage provision was found in the contract of sale, the New Jersey
court has indicated that a "sale" is "consummated" when the owner
and purchaser enter a contract of sale38 unless the intention of the
parties otherwise is clearly expressed.3 9 This was accomplished by
drawing a distinction between a provision for payment of a commis-
sion "at the time of consummation" and one providing for payment
36. Compare the emphasis attached to the term "due" in George H. Beckman,
Inc. v. (Zinke's) Rainbow's End, Inc., 40 N.J. Super. 193, 198, 122 A.2d 519, 522
(App. Div. 1956).
37. See text supported by notes 26-27 supra.
38. For a clarifying discussion of what is meant by the term "sale" or "sold"
in a real estate brokerage agreement, as the New Jersey court understands it see
Resky v. Meyer, 98 N.J.L. 168, 172, 119 Atl. 97, 99 (Ct. Err. & App. 1922) where
it is said:
The matter turns on the meaning to be given to the word "sold," by itself,
and considered with the context. Does it mean "conveyed," or contracted by
binding contract? Or does it mean purchaser and seller agree on the terms?
Ordinarily, it means the last when used in a broker's commission contract....
See also Steinberg v. Mindlin, 96 N.J.L. 206, 208, 114 At. 451, 451-52 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1921); Freeman v. Van Wagenen, 90 N.J.L. 358, 101 At. 55 (Sup. Ct.
1917) (the case most often cited for the proposition). While not all courts would
agree with the last sentence of the quotation supra, nearly all would agree that
where the property owner and purchaser have entered into a binding, uncondi-
tional contract of sale, a "sale" has been effected and the property "sold." Com-
pare Doe v. Eggleston, 106 N.J.L. 565, 146 Atl. 175 (Ct. Err. & App. 1929)
where, without discussion, the court interpreted a provision providing for com-
mission "for effecting this sale, to be paid at settlement" as fixing only the time
for payment; Klipper v. Schlossberg, 96 N.J.L. 397, 115 At]. 345 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
But cf. Haber v. Goldberg, 92 N.J.L. 367, 105 Atl. 874 (Ct. Err. & App. 1918).
But a conditional contract or mere option will not suffice. Bell v. Siwoff, 123
N.J.L. 11, 7 A.2d 826 (Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd, 124 N.J.L. 563, 12 A.2d 881 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1940).
39. Hatch v. Dayton, 130 N.J.L. 425, 33 A.2d 350 (Sup. Ct. 1943); Morse v.
Conley, 83 N.J.L. 416, 85 Atl. 196 (Sup. Ct. 1912).
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"for consummating this sale." Commission was denied in the former
case because the court felt that the language "spoke in futuro." Re-
covery was allowed in the latter instance because the provision was
thought not to provide a clear indication of a contrary intent.40 Here
again, the strong preference for a "time" rationale is manifested.
And, in a very recent case, the appellate division conveniently over-
looked the fact that a commission agreement, found in the contract
of sale, provided for the commission to be "due" as well as "payable"
on the happening of an outside event.4' The court found that the
broker's commission was not contingent. In view of the "due and
payable" clause, it would seem that the result was reached by inter-
preting the provision "in consideration of services rendered in con-
summating this sale" as an acknowledgement of existing debt-ergo,
not looking "in futuro." 2
Fieldnmt v. Thonms- involved a brokerage agreement executed
prior" to the entering of a contract of sale between the property owner
and a purchaser. The agreement provided for a commission based on
a percentage "of the sale price payable when title is passed." While
the brokerage provision does not use the term "consummate," the
opinion does in finding that, "under our cases the sale was consum-
mated when [the owner and purchaser entered a binding contract]."44
Thus, the Fieldman case would seem to indicate that the addition of
a separate "when payable" provision would not affect interpretation
of an independent clause employing the term "consummate."
In addition to the above considerations, the specific language ac-
companying an undertaking to "consummate" is of prime importance.
Thus, "if title is consummated" has been regarded as a plain state-
ment of a contingency which is not met by the obtaining of a contract
of sale. , , And, a provision that "this commission is contingent upon
40. In the present case the words "for consummating this sale" do not nec-
essarily refer to any future event and can just as well refer to an accom-
plished fact, as far as the words of the contract are concerned.Hatch v. Dayton, 10 N.J.L. 425, 427, 33 A.2d 350, 352 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
41. Winter v. Toldt, 32 N.J.Super. 443, 448, 108 A.2d 648, 651 (App. Div.
1954).
42. See text supported by note 35 supra.
43. 10 N.J. Misc. 48, 157 Atl. 554 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
44. Id. at 50, 157 AtI. at 555. Cf. Murray Apfelbaum, Inc. v. Topf, 104 N.J.L.
343, 344, 140 Atl. 295, 296 (Ct. Err. & App. 1928) where other phrases ("if and
when title ...is passed," "it being distinctly understood that we shall not be
under any obligation whatsoever ... if for any reason ... title to said premises
is not closed," and "we shall be liable only in the event of passing of title") added
to that of "consummation" led the court to interpret the provision as making the
passing of title a condition precedent.
45. Kuligowski, v. McCullough, 4 N.J. Misc. 449, 133 AtI. 71 (Sup. Ct. 1926),
aff'd, 103 N.J.L. 700, 137 AtI. 437 (Ct. Err. & App. 1927) ; cf. Murray Apfelbaum,
Inc. v. Topf, 104 N.J.L. 343, 344, 140 Atl. 295, 296 (Ct. Err. & App. 1928) ("If
and when title to premises is passed... [a commission will be paid] for effecting
the consumation of the sale ... it being distinctly understood that we shall not
be under any obligation whatsoever ... if ... title ... is not closed . . . , and
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the transaction being consummated and in the event that such trans-
action is not consummated then and in that event no commission shall
be paid to said brokers" has been considered clearly conditional."
Similarly, whether the language refers to the broker's undertaking or
to the payment of commission, the use of such phrases as "actually,"14
"in the event that,"48 "upon," 49 "until,"
5 0 
"unless,"51 "if," r 2 "when, '5 3
"when and if," 54 or "if, as and when, '"' or a combination thereof,
coupled with a named event that must of necessity occur before the
owner would be divested of title and the purchaser of the purchase
price, in a brokerage agreement not containing the term "consumma-
tion," results in interpretation that a condition precedent exists.'0
Where such language is employed there would normally be no justifi-
cation for utilization of a "time" rationale.
we shall be liable only in event of passing of title... .") where it was held that
passing of title was a condition precedent and the broker was not entitled to his
commission although a contract of sale had been executed.
46. Todiss v. Garruto, 34 N.J. Super. 333, 112 A.2d 285 (App. Div. 1955).
47. Alexander Summer Co. v. Weil, 16 N.J. Super. 94, 83 A.2d 787 (App. Div.
1951) (also involved use of "in the event that" and "if, as and when"); Uuffy &
Thomas, Inc. v. Miller, 5 N.J. Misc. 77, 135 Atl. 500 (Sup. Ct. 1927) (also in-
volved use of "unless"); cf. Keifhaber v. Yannelli, 9 N.J. Super. 139, 75 A.2d 478
(App. Div. 1950) (also involved the phrases "if this is closed" and "until"). New
York law was applied in the latter case, but the decision has been favorably cited
in subsequent New Jersey cases. See Marschalk v. Weber, 11 N.J. Super. 16, 25,
77 A.2d 505, 510 (App. Div. 1950).
48. Alexander Summer Co. v. Weil, supra note 47 (also involved use of "actu-
ally," and "if, as and when"); Forman v. Bedminster Land Co., 110 N.J.L. 1,
163 Atl. 123 (Sup. Ct. 1932) (the court added the word "only" before the phrase
"in the event that"; this was apparently done to add emphasis to the contingent
nature of the phrase); Soloff v. Freedman, 103 N.J.L. 403, 135 Atl. 867 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1927).
49. Real Estate Exchange v. Lieberman, 8 N.J. Super. 99, 102, 73 A.2d 350,
352 (Ap. Div. 1950) (dictum).
50. f. Marschalk v. Weber, 11 N.J. Super. 16, 20, 77 A 2d 505 509 (App. Div.
1950) (dictum); Keifhaber v. Yannelli, 9 N.J. Super. 139, 75 A.2d 478 (App. Div.
1950) (also involved use of "if this is closed" and "actually").
51. Duffy & Thomas, Inc. v. Miller, 5 N.J. Misc. 77, 135 Atl. 500 (Sup. Ct.
1927) (also involved use of "actually").
52. Keifhaber v. Yannelli, 9 N.J. Super. 139, 75 A.2d 478 (App. Div. 1950)
(also involved use of "actually").
53. Slonim, Ltd. v. Bankers Mortgage & Realty Co., 133 N.J.L. 45, 42 A.2d
396 (Sup. Ct. 1945); cf. Marschalk v. Weber, 11 N.J. Super. 16, 20, 77 A.2d 505,
509 (App. Div. 1950) (dictum) (also involved use of "until").
54. Cf. Rothman Realty Corp. v. MacLain, 16 N.J. Super. 280, 84 A.2d 482
(Ch. 1951) (suit between brokerage firm and discharged former salesman whose
pay was to be a percentage of the overall commission).
55. Alexander Summer Co. v. Weil, 16 N.J. Super. 94, 83 A.2d 787 (App. Div.
1951) (also involved use of "in the event that" and "actually").
56. Compare Kram v. Losito, 105 N.J.L. 588, 589, 147 Atl. 465 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1929) where the provision was simply an agreement to pay commission
"upon the execution and payment . . . of the balance of the initial payment
of the purchase prise, the court adhering to a time rationale, with Fornan
v. Bedminster Land Co., 110 N.J.L. 1, 163 At. 123 (Sup. Ct. 1932) where the
agreement was to pay a commission in the event that title closes" which was
construed to state a "condition precedent." See also Feldman v. Holdman, 4 N. J.
Misc. 451, 133 Atl. 71 (Sup. Ct. 1926). For a recent acknowledgment of the
acceptance of the conclusions stated in the above textual paragraph, see George
H. Beckmann, Inc. v. (Zinke's) Rainbow's End, Inc., 40 N.J. Super. 193, 198, 122
A.2d 519, 521-22 (App. Div. 1956) (dictum).
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In the absence of such "clear" provisions the particular wording
used in the brokerage provision has served to excite the drawing of
exceedingly fine distinctions by the New Jersey courts, a fact rec-
ognized by the courts themselves. The actual intention of the parties
may be clearly stated. Thus, some provisions have been easily inter-
preted as stating a condition precedent,58 while others have been regu-
larly interpreted as providing only the time of payment.59 Unfortu-
nately, however, the parties often fail to use language clearly showing
their intention. And even the "clear" provisions may find expression
in a unique situation. Therefore, the "fine distinctions" would seem
to indicate more basic considerations than are involved in mere verbal
differences.
As has already been shown, the time at which the provision first
finds expression is of primary importance. If it is after the broker
has performed his undertaking, embodiment of an "acknowledgement"
of debt in the brokerage terms used will result in utilization of the
"time" rationale. It is here, in the extreme willingness to find such
an "acknowledgement," that one clear picture of the New Jersey
judicial attitude is found. If, however, the brokerage provision in
question was enunciated prior to activity by the broker, the internal
construction of the provision assumes paramount importance-is
there a "separate, unqualified agreement to pay" the commission?
If there is, that agreement will measure the broker's undertaking; if
there is not, the "outside event" stated in the commission clause will
qualify the broker's needed action. New Jersey opinions have referred
t, "surrounding circumstances"-what the parties were attempting
to do in the light of their particular situations. But whether these
are examples of considerations to which the court looks before de-
cision or of reasoning by which a pre-determined decision is but-
tressed, is not clear from the opinions themselves. The careful lawyer
will, of course, impress the decisional court with the consequences of
a particular answer. That is, if the court concludes that the broker-
age provision is intended to provide only the "time" of payment, the
broker will become entitled to a commission through performing or
having performed the undertaking, even though the owner may not
have received funds with which to make payment. Thus, under such
an interpretation, the broker will be entitled to his commission if the
(late on which the "outside event" was scheduled to occur has passed,
or should a date not be specified, if a reasonable time for its occur-
57. Richard v. Falleti, 1a N.J. Super. 534, 81 A.2d 17 (App. Div. 1951).
58. E.gi., Todiss v. Garruto, 34 N.J. Super. 333, 112 A.2d 285 (App. Div. 1955).
59. See § II supra.
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rence has elapsed.5 9a Should it be determined that a "condition
precedent" is stated, the broker may find that, although he has ren-
dered valuable services to the land owner in an attempt to accept the
offer, the additional "outside event" of the commission clause has not
occurred; therefore, he is not entitled to compensation. Does this mean
that the owner is free to defeat the occurrence of the outside event?
What, if any, action by the owner will result in an immediate obliga-
tion on his part to pay the promised commission, notwithstanding
non-occurrence of the outside event? Suppose it is the purchaser who
is at fault in non-occurrence of the outside event? These questions
form the basis of the following discussion.
(b) Obligation of a Listing Property Owner
Side by side with the foregoing decisions interpreting the effect of
the language of the commission clause upon entitlement of the broker
to the stipulated commission, came decisions involving a claim by the
plaintiff-broker that, although the event referred to in the brokerage
agreement had failed to occur, the property owner had acted in a
manner which had led to the failure; therefore, the broker was never-
theless entitled, the condition precedent to the owner's obligation to
pay being no longer available. It thus became necessary to determine
whether any fault of the owner would suffice to entitle the broker to
his commission. For purposes of this section whether the pertinent
brokerage language is expressed as a part of the broker's undertaking
or has direct reference only to the payment of commissions has no
basic significance; therefore, the two situations will be commingled
unless expressly stated otherwiseo In answering a broker's conten-
tion in the simple form stated above, the courts have experienced no
difficulty. However, more difficult problems were encountered. How
extreme must the fault have been? To what extent must an owner
"cooperate" in bringing about the occurrence of the event? And,
what effect does the interpretation of the agreement as either stating
a "time" for payment or a "condition precedent" have on the matter?
The Hinds case had a direct answer for the first question, a direct
reference to the second, and a partial answer for the last. Relying
primarily on English authority,1 that case answered the "extremity
59a. Since such a date has uniformly been designated either in the commission
provision or in the seller-purchaser contract, recourse to the general contract rule
that where an offeror has failed to specify a time limit during which the offeree
has the power of acceptance, such power continues for a reasonable time, has not
been necessary. See 1 CoRniN, CONTRACTS §§ 36, 96 (1950).
60. This statement, however, is not to be construed as pertaining to the effect
of a holding that a stated event has reference only to the "time" of payment, and
does not constitute a "condition."
61. Malins v. Freeman, 4 Bing. (N.C.) 395, 132 Eng. Rep. 839 (Ch. 1838);
Doe v. Bancks, 4 B. & A. 401, 106 Eng. Rep. 984 (K.B. 1821) ; Planche v. Colburn,
8 Bing. 14, 131 Eng. Rep. 305 (N.P. 1831); Hall v. Conder, 2 C.B. (n.s.) 22,
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of fault" question by holding that, for a broker to rely successfully
on the owner's fault as excusing a "condition" requiring the happen-
ing of a named event, he must show that the failure resulted from the
owner's willful or fraudulent acts "in violation of his own under-
taking, express or implied." - Thus, under this decision, were a com-
mission clause to be interpreted as constituting a "condition" the
condition would not be excused in the absence of rather extreme
action of the property owner. Could it be that a desire to by-pass
such a requirement was the true reason for initiation of New Jersey's
heavy preference for the "time" rationale?
With the advent of more extensive litigation involving brokerage
agreements, a minor crack appeared in the "willful or fraudulent"
requirement. This accompanied, in point of time, the New Jersey
adoption of the "time" rationale. Thus, it was soon to be indicated
that a capricious refusal to act by the owner would suffice as an
excuse.'- The decisional case raised the question, suppose the owner
cannot or will not deliver good title? In the former situation it has
been held that inability of the property owner to furnish good title
does not constitute the severe degree of fault necessary to result in
the excuse of a condition precedent.64 It has also been accepted that
refusal of a property owner to deliver good title, to operate as an
excuse of a condition, would require a finding that such refusal was
"capricious"--and failure to disclose a title defect is not, in itself,
a "willful, fraudulent, or capricious" refusal to act.66 In reaching the
latter decision, the court reviewed most of the preceding decisions
140 Eng. Rep. 318 (C.P. 1857); Inchbald v. The Western Co., 17 C.B. (n.s.) 733,
144 Eng. Rep. 293 (C.P. 1864); Horler v. Carpenter, 2 C.B. (n.s.) 56, 140 Eng.
Rep. 332 (C.P. 1857); HURLSTONE, BONDs 49.
62. 36 N.J.L. at 334. It was held that a cloud on the title, of which the brokerhad been apprised, did not constitute an excuse. One act clearly a violation of
the owner's "implied undertaking" is the shifting of grounds for refusal to carry
out a contract with the purchaser where the broker might have supplied or cor-
rected the deficiency newly asserted had it been made at the time of first refusal.
Cf. Schanerman v. Everett and Carbin, Inc., 10 N.J. 215, 89 A.2d 689 (1952).
W". Lehrhoff v. Schwartsky, 2 N.J. Misc. 353, 854, 125 AtI. 496 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
The earlier case, Rauchwanger v. Katzin, 82 N.J.L. 339, 82 AtI. 510 (Sup. Ct.
1912) had first mentioned the effect of the "capriciousness" of the property owner.
See Alexander Summer Co. v. Weil, 16 N.J. Super. 94, 83 A.2d 787 (App. Div.
1951) for a recent restatement of the rule and a discussion of its application to
various fact situations. Cf. George H. Beckman, Inc. v. (Zinke's) Rainbow's End,Inc,, 122 A.2d 519 (N.J. App. Div. 1956) (misrepresentation by owner).
64. Murray Apfelbaum, Inc. v. Topf, 104 N.J.L. 343, 140 Atl. 295 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1928) ; cf. Gottlieb v. Connolly, 5 N.J. Misc. 372, 136 Atl. 599 (Sup. Ct. 1927)(trial court found that mistake in size of property involved was innocent, not
fraudulent; appellate court simply held the contract secured by the broker "void
through mistake," therefore the broker was not entitled to commission).
65. Lehrhoff v. Schwartsky, 2 N.J. Misc. 353, 125 Atl. 496 (Sup. Ct. 1924);
Feist & Feist, Inc. v. Spitzer, 107 N.J.L. 138, 150 Atl. 486 (Ct. Err. & App. 1930)(although involving a listing treated by the court as conditional, the court relied
on Dermody v. New Jersey Realties, Inc., 101 N.J.L. 334, 128 AtI. 265 (Ct. Err.& App. 1925), which case is generally considered as a "time" decision).
66. Keifhaber v. Yannelli, 9 N.J. Super. 139, 75 A.2d 478 (App. Div. 1950).
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involving consideration of defective title as it is related to the matter
of "willful," "fraudulent," or "capricious," distinguishing many. Of
these, the most notable, because of the help they give in determining
the content of the "fault" phrase, were Keifhaber v. Yannellio7 dis-
tinguished on the basis that the property owner there had made no
showing of impossibility or great expense in removing the title cloud,
therefore the owner was "capriciously" failing to cooperate; and
Feist & Feist, Inc. v. Spitzerq- on the ground that there the property
owner had arbitrarily breached a valid contract with the purchaser.
Then, relying on Murray Apfelbaum, Inc. v. Topf00 for the proposition
that only where the property owner fraudulently concealed the fact
of title defect (which the court failed to find in the case then under
consideration) would the condition be excused, the court reached its
decision that failure to disclose the title defect did not constitute
"waiver" of the condition. And, in a case where the vendee refused
to consummate a contract, the court added substance to the "fraudu-
lent, willful, or capricious" grounds upon which a waiver of a stated
condition may be predicated, when it said,
In the present case it is not evident that the announced refusal
of the vendee to consummate the contract of sale was in any
wise induced by the vendors. Nor is it disclosed that the vendors
and vendee deceitfully contrived through the medium of the com-
promise agreement to defeat the claim of the brokers. Upon the
occurrence of the breach the vendors in reality occupied the situa-
tion of passive victims searching only for available salvage ....
We are not persuaded that in the circumstances of the present
case the conduct of the vendors in entering into the agreement
of compromise participated in the hindrance or prevention of the
consummation of the contract of sale within the application of
the legal principle akin to that of waiver.70
To this point the discussion has assumed that a condition precedent
to payment of commission has been stated. Suppose, however, the
brokerage provision is interpreted as stating only a "time" of pay-
ment. Would such an interpretation be significant should the outside
event fail to materialize? New Jersey decisions are explicit that, if
the commission provision is interpreted as providing a "time" for
payment only, it is immaterial whose fault it is that the named event
fails to occur-the broker's commission is earned when he has secured
a purchaser on the terms specified in the listing and he is entitled
to payment thereof when the date on which the event was scheduled
67. 9 N J. Super. 139, 75 A.2d 478 (App. Div. 1950).
68. 107 N.J.L. 138, 150 AtI. 406 (Ct. Err. & App. 1930).
69. 104 N.J.L. 343, 140 AtI. 295 (Ct. Err. & App. 1928).
70. Todiss v. Garruto, 34 N.J. Super. 333, 342, 112 A.2d 285, 289-90 (App. Div.
1955).
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to occur has arrived7 1 Thus, the New Jersey courts have drawn a
clear distinction between a non-conditional listing and one stating a
condition precedent when they have been called upon to determine
the ability of the broker involved to rely on the listing owner having
a marketable title. If there is no condition stated, he can, in the
absence of his own knowledge of title defect,72 rely on the owner
having such, and will be entitled to his commission upon producing
a purchaser according to the terms of the listing though the transac-
tion fail because the owner's title is not marketable. 3
71, See Samuel R. Laden, Inc. v. Lidgerwood Estates, Inc., 15 N.J. Misc. 498,
5ou, P2 Atl. 425, 426 (Sup. Ct. 1937) where the court, after reviewing the
accepted consideration of "whose fault" in cases involving a stated condition
precedent, stated,
[Ilf a reasonable construction of the terms involved indicates a designa-
tion of the time of payment, rather than a condition precedent or a contin-
gency, we can no longer be influenced by the question as to through whose
faulft the title failed to close ..
Then, quoting from J. R. Tucker, Inc. v. Mahaffey, 6 N.J. Misc. 17, 139 Ati. 806(Sup. Ct. 1928), continued,
"1i]t was immaterial whose fault it was that final settlement did not take
place, since the payment of commission was not made contingent upon a
iinnl :ettlement taking place."
Un, il the Tacker decision nearly all New Jersey cases in which the "time"
rationale had been accepted had involved failure of the occurrence of the named
e%,-nt due to the fault of the owner, and it was at least arguable that such fault
was the real reason for development of the "time" rationale.
Betore the Tlckei decision had clearly established the immateriality of fault
in the a) ea involving a statement of "time" only, the New Jersey courts had "run
the gomut" in specifying reasons for a decision favoring the broker. For example,
in LtL w v. Aberbach, 4 NJ. Misc. 169, 132 Atl. 241 (Sup. Ct. 7926) ("on deliv-
er-y of the deed") the court had relied, in finding for the broker, on (1) it was
the owmner's fault (defective title) that there had been no "delivery"; (2) a broker
('c;i reIy o1 bIs vendor's title; ( 3) the construction against the existence of a
,,difin; and (4) it would be in harmony with the intent of the parties that
tli claiise be construed to relate only to the "time of payment." After the Tucker
d cision, the first consideration stated would be immaterial in light of the fourth,
andl the zecond consideration would be but a result of the fourth. But ef. Field-
mm v Thomas, 10 N.J. Misc. 48, 157 Atl. 554 (Sup. Ct. 1931) where the court,
afte,' finding the involved clause related to "time of payment" only, relied on the
" bst itnted payment" case, Dermodv v. New Jersey Realties, Inc., 101 N.J.L. 334,
12S A. 265 (Ct. Err. & App. 1925) in saying that the property owner could not
defeat tie brokTer's claim for commission by having himself relieved of the obliga-
t i n to rfass title. It would seem that this decisional language resulted either from
a unwarranted desire to buttress an already proper decision, or a failure to
di cern the true meanin- of the Talnekr case.
72. Cf. Ki-im v. Sacks, 7 N.J. Misc. 318, 145 Atl. 237 (Sup. Ct. 1929) (broker
ii,, of a provision in the contract of sale whereby the contract would be ren-
dtred "nul and void" if the owner were unable to secure an outstanding lease
on the property for the purchaser--owner failed, broker not entitled to commis-
stin); Hinds . Henry, 36 N.J.L. 328 (Sup. Ct. 1873) (where broker knew of
clmd oii owner's title the fact of a cloud could not support a finding of such fraud
by the ovner as would excuse performance of a condition precedent).
7'. Ludwig v. Aberbach, 4 N.J. Misc. 169, 132 At. 241 (Sup. Ct. 1926) ; Klip-
I,,,r v. Schlossberg, 96 N.J.L. :397, 115 Atl. 345 (Sup. Ct. 1921) (condition to the
undetaking) ; cf. J. I. Kislak, Inc. v. Judge, 102 N.J.L. 506, 133 AtU. 74 (Sup. Ct.
IQO) N; here the court, in discussing the effect of Sadler v. Young, 78 N.J.L. 594,
7 Aftl 89) (Ct. Err. & App. 1910) which had held that the New Jersey statute
of frauds did not prevent a real estate broker from recovering commission on an
ot al awreement where the listing party was not the "owner" of such property, found
a 1,t oke r entitled to a commission though the listing party was without clear title.
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III. NEW YORK
Because the courts of other jurisdictions have generally accepted
New York brokerage opinions as embracing the "condition precedent"
rationale to the exclusion of any other, and because these same courts
have professed 4 to follow the New York decisions, New York cases
have been selected for individual analysis. The absolute "condition"
characterization of the New York cases is unfounded, however, al-
though the decisions do demonstrate clearly a strong preference for
such analysis. Prior to the decision in Amies v. Wesnofske 8 in 1931
even this preference lacked clear manifestation. Thus opinions had
referred, in terms connoting no preference whatever, to a proper use
of the "time" rationale.76 The two cases most often relied upon as
having been based on such rationale, however, Morgan v. Calvert7
and Meltzer v. Straus 7 were far from full-hearted support for the
proposition, for in each case, while the decisional rationale definitely
stated the "time" interpretation, the fact that the property owner had
been at fault in defeat of the transaction looms as a crucial factor.7D
That is, the decisional courts seemed to be convinced that a holding
in terms of "time of payment" would more logically lead to the "just
result"-that of precluding the owner from defeating the broker.
This, of course, directly presents the problem of the co-operation
required of the listing owner. But before this factor is considered, it
will be wise to set forth the New York handling of various specific
listing language, taking special note of the Amies decision which
In stating the reason for this rule, the court in the Ludwig case supra said,
The reason for non-delivery of a deed was directly due to the defendant's
inability to give a good title. The plaintiff ought not be made to suffer on
that account. If it was intended that no commission was to be paid unless
an actual sale was consummated by the delivery of a deed it should have
been explicitly so stated in the contract.
4 N.J. Misc. at 171, 132 Atl. at 241.
Thus, it is seen that the strong New Jersey interpretation against the presence
of a condition plays a crucial part in yet another phase of the "New Jersey" rule.
74. That the decisions have not actually followed the complete New York
rationale will be obvious from the following discussion.
75. 255 N.Y. 156, 174 N.E. 436 (1931).
76. See, e.g., Meckes v. Mullen, 75 Misc. 303, 304, 132 N.Y. Supp. 942 (N.Y.
City Ct. 1912).
77. 126 App. Div. 327, 110 N.Y. Supp. 855 (2d Dep't 1908).
78. 61 Misc. 250, 113 N.Y. Supp. 583 (Sup. Ct., App. T. 1908).
79. See, e.g., Larson v. Burroughs, 131 App. Div. 877, 116 N.Y. Supp. 358(2d Dep't 1909) which, in reversing a lower court holding for the plaintiff-broker
under a listing providing for payment of commissions "when balance of cash
amount to be paid is made and deed actually delivered," said,
The learned Municipal Court rested its judgment for the plaintiff upon
Morgan v. Calvert (126 App. Div. 327) [110 N.Y. Supp. 855]. But the point
decided in that case was that the vendor who had agreed to sell his property
for a specific sum on a certain day could not interpose, as a defense against
the broker suing for commissions which the vendor had agreed to pay at the
closing of title, his own wrong [his own defect in title] which prevented the
closing thereof.
Id. at 878, 116 N.Y. Supp. at 358.
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interpreted a clause providing for payment of commissions "on the
closing of title '5c' as stating a "condition precedent" as a matter of
court determination. ' This was done in the face of a vigorous dis-
senting opinion stressing that determination of the effect of such a
provision was a question of fact to be submitted to the jury.8 2 From
the quantum of reliance placed on the Arnies opinion, it seems clear
that it is largely responsible both for the erroneous characterization
of the New York opinions and for the resultant use of the "condition
precedent" rationale by other courts.
Care must be exercised in interpretation of the sense in which a
New York court has employed the term "time." The fact that there
might be what the court will call a "time" provision does not neces-
sarily mean that once the time at which the event was scheduled to
occur has passed the broker is entitled to his commission, for it is of
the essence of the New York view that, although the commission has
been earned, payment may not be due and may be conditioned upon
the actual occurrence of the outside event." The New York courts
have, as a matter of the interpretation of the specific brokerage
provision,"' used the term "time" to describe this latter situation as
80. The listing was oral and the conflicting testimony concerning its content
provides grist for the mill of those who have decried approval of oral listings. In
this case there was not only disagreement between the plaintiff-broker and the
defendant-owner, but in the language used to express the alleged "condition" as
delineated by the multiple owner-witnesses as well as by the trial judge and the
court of appeal. See 255 N.Y. at 160-61, 174 N.E. at 437. While I have employed
the phrase "on the closing of title" in the text, there was testimony that the term
"when" was actually employed and the trial court in its instructions to the jury
employel such term. See note 82 infra. And the court of appeal specifically stated
that such term clearly connoted a condition. 255 N.Y. at 161, 174 N.E. at 437;
ef. A. H. Ivins Co. v. Martin Holding Co., 84 Misc. 437, 146 N.Y. Supp. 126 (1st
Iep't 1914). But see Levy v. Forster, 224 App. Div. 463, 231 N.Y. Supp. 238
(Ist Dep't 1928). See note 87 infra.
81. This conclusion follows from approval of the instruction of the trial court
to the jury that the plaintiff-broker "might not recover if the [owner] promised
to Jay . . . 'the other half of [the commission] when the title was closed.'" 255
N.Y. at 161, 174 N.E. at 4:37.
82. 255 N.Y. at 165, 174 N.E. at 439. If there is a dispute as to the actual
terms of the listing agreement or if, considering the terms themselves and the
surrounding circumstances, the terms are ambiguous, it is for the jury to say
what the listing required. Slocum v. Ostrander, 141 App. Div. 380, 126 N.Y. Supp.
219 (1 t Dep't 1910) ; cf. Watson v. Muskegon S.S. Corp., 208 App. Div. 158, 203
N.Y. Supp. 194 (1st Dep't 1924); see note 87 infra; 3 CORBIN, CONTmACTS § 554
(1!o.51). Compare text supported by notes 152, 198-206 infra. In this regard,
parol evidence is admissible to aid in resolving the ambiguity, but the language
will usually be construed against the maker (usually the broker). See O'Connor-
Sullivan, Ihc. v. Otto, 283 App. Div. 269, 127 N.Y.S.2d 373 (3d Dep't 1954).
8:3. See, e..g., Finnegan & Di Zerega v. Bank of New York, 277 App. Div. 562,
101 N.Y.S.2d 322 (1st Dep't 1950), aff'd, 302 N.Y. 876, 100 N.E.2d 53 (1951);
ef. Bliven v. Lighthouse, 231 N.Y. 64, 131 N.E. 570 (1921). For extended treat-
ment of such analysis, see 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 627 (1951). Compare note 92
infrat. Consider text supported by notes 102-06 infra.
84. Cf. Fuller v. Bradley Construction Co., 183 App. Div. 6, 170 N.Y. Supp.
320 (2d Dep't 1918), afl'd, 229 N.Y. 605, 129 N.E. 925 (1920).
Another pre-A w es decision, North Sea Developments, Inc. v. Burnett, 254 N.Y.
374, 17:3, N.E. 228 (1930), ret'ersing 228 App. Div. 444, 239 N.Y. Supp. 634 (2d
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well as that first suggested above. In fact, this found express state-
ment in Amies v. Wesnofske8s Such use, however, does not accord
with the sense in which the term is here employed.
Because the Amies decision in its interpretation of an oral "when
payable" brokerage provision executed prior to any activity on the
part of the broker, has enjoyed an exceedingly great acceptance by
the courts of other jurisdictions as well as by the New York courts,
it seems desirable to place it in its complete setting. First, consider
the New York treatment of cases involving the same or similar "when
payable" brokerage language, with and without additional qualifying
language 6 In Amies great reliance was placed on the meaning of the
word "when" as used in the listing agreement, and the conclusion
was reached that employment of such a word "clearly indicate[s]
that a promise is not to be performed except upon a condition." 81
Other listing language has in clear terms imported a condition to
the payment of commission. Exemplary of these, and an early de-
cision that has enjoyed authoritative influence, is Fittichauer v. Van
Wycks" which involved a provision that commissions were not to be
paid "until and unless title passed." (Emphasis supplied.) Here,
thought the court, was conditional language without question. And
Dep't 1930) had found the appellate division enunciating a "time" interpretation
which was reversed by the court of appeals saying that it was a "question of fact
whether before the broker had earned any commissions he agreed that his com-
pensation should be [based on payments to be made)," the inference being that,
if made prior to such time, a valid condition precedent had been stated.
85. [Wlhether the one construction or the other be correct ["time" or "con-
dition"), the result must be the same; since, if the event does not befall, or a
time coincident with the happpening of the event does not arrive, in neither
case may performance be exacted.
255 N.Y. at 162, 174 N.E. at 438. In fact, the Amies decision specifically rejected
the meaning ascribed to a "when payable" clause by the New Jersey courts as
well as by this paper when it continued: "Nor will it do to say that a promise to
pay 'on the closing of title' is a promise to pay on the date fixed by the contract
of sale for the closing of title."
86. Other New York cases involving "when payable" brokerage language will
be considered in the "General" discussion that follows.
87. 255 N.Y. at 161, 174 N.E. at 437. It is interesting to note that the court
relied on 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 671 (1920) and that in a later edition Profes-
sor Williston relied on the Amies decision. See 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 671(rev. ed. 1936) ; Cf. 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 639 (1951).
At this point the dissent has some support in the prior New York decisions.
For example, in Levy v. Forster, 224 App. Div. 463, 231 N.Y. Supp. 238 (1st Dep't
1928), the court had said that ordinarily "when" did not connote a condition. It is
true that the court there said that the language was ambiguous in the light of
surrounding circumstances and should be submitted to the jury for its determina-
tion of whether a condition had been stated. It is also true that the provision in
the Levy case concluded with a "due and payable" clause keyed to another event
that had not taken place and therefore it could be considered that the broker had
not performed the required act of acceptance. But these facts do not change the
meaning ascribed to the term "when." Prior authority for the finding of a 'condi-
tion" in similar "when payable" clauses, however, was present. See, e.g., Costa
v. Schetz, 175 N.Y. Supp. 476, 477 (1st Dep't 1919) (dictum). See also Wisen-
berger v. Mayers, 281 App. Div. 171, 117 N.Y.S.2d 557 (1st Dep't 1952), appeal
withdrawn, 306 N.Y. 732, 117 N.E.2d 910 (1954).
88. 92 N.Y. Supp. 241 (Sup. Ct., App. T. 1905).
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the same result follows although only one of the terms is employed 9
Until the Amies decision the presence or absence of these additional
words was of prime importance;- but since Anies the words would
seem to provide little more than an additional peg on which to hang
a -condition" coat.
Of course, those cases involving brokerage language expressly pro-
viding that the commission shall not be deemed earned unless or until
the named event has occurred properly result in refusal of recovery
to a broker when, without the listing owner's fault, the event fails
to occur.'" In so holding the decisional language employed does not
indicate that the courts are concerned with, or even aware of, the
possibility that such phraseology should be considered as part of the
required act for the broker's acceptance of the property owner's offer
for a unilateral contract." Rather, the courts have accepted, sub
s). Weinev v. Infeld, 116 Misc. 323, 190 N.Y. Supp. 82 (2d Dep't 1921)
("uness"); 1. Couper v. O'Neill, 53 Misc. 319, 103 N.Y. Supp. 122 (Sup. Ct.
1 n) (shal1 not be due and payable "until"). But cf. Gilder v. Davis, 137 N.Y.
504, :'3 N.E. 599 (1893).
!in. F,,w example, the absence of these words was made the express distinguish-
ing factor between the statement of a "condition precedent" and a simple "time"
clause in Meltzer v. Straus, 61 Misc. 250, 113 N.Y. Supp. 583 (Sup. Ct., App. T.
19(8) (commission agreement was part of the contract of sale).
.1. Saurn v. Capital Realty Development, Inc., 268 N.Y. 335, 197 N.E. 303
t1{5) ("until"); Mitchell v. Barnes, 281 App. Div. 681, 117 N.Y.S.2d 95 (2d
D ep't 19 2); Moftat v. Gerry Estates, Inc., 259 App. Div. 403, 19 N.Y.S.2d 579
(Ist Dep't 1940) ("unless and until"); Murray R. Realty Co. v. Manhattan Co.,
162 Misc. 21, 293 N.Y. Supp. 605, aTff'd mere., 251 App. Div. 717, 298 N.Y. Supp.
17G, (lst Dep't 1937); Verity v. Ottinger 223 App. Div. 344, 227 N.Y. Supp. 650
1Isf Dep't 1928); ef. Reibeisen v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 64 N.Y.S.2d 529 (Sup. Ct.
14G), ,ON7d, 76 N.Y.S.2d 837 (1st Dep't), appeal disnzissed, 297 N.Y. 950, 80
N.E,2d : 46 (1948) ("no commission . . .if title fails to close"); Morgan v. Cal-
vert, 126 App. Div. 327, 110 N.Y. Supp. 855 (2d Dep't 1908); Nekarda v. Pres-
be,' er, 123 App. Div. 418, 107 N.Y. Supp. 897 (1st Dep't 1908).
Othei examples of express provisions that serve to protect a property owner
from having to pay commissions where the contemplated transaction fails to
result in transferring title to the property to the proposed purchaser in exchange
fi the t, ansfer of the purchase price to the owner are of course available. For
x.'ample, in the early Sevnour v. St. Luke's Hospital, 28 App. Div. 119, 50 N.Y.
Supp. 989 (1st Dep't 1898), appeal dismn">sed, 159 N.Y. 524, 53 N.E. 1132 (1899)
cas, t w, as a provision for payment of part of the commission at the close
of all dealings and an additional proviso that "in the event of the transaction not
1being fulfilled, I waive all claims [to the deferred brokerage]." So, too, does a
piovisioii that should the transaction fail for any reason no brokerage will be
paid. Holler & Henretig, Inc. v. 3620-168th Street, Inc., 274 App. Div. 1007,
84 N.Y. 2d 767 (2d Dep't 1948); Reibeisen v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., supra. See
(;reric-1 Rralty Agency, Inc. v. Gruner, 63 N.Y.S.2d 443 (1st Dep't 1946); Berger
v ( 01mmnity Founders, Inc., 83 N.Y.S.2d 791 (N.Y. City Ct. 1948).
!2. of course, the required act of performance ("undertaking") is quite often
:,oniibn i rto e than securing a purchaser ready, able and willing to purchase.
W\hrceoch is the case, that act must occur before the broker is entitled. Whether
an additional phrase providing for the actual payment upon the happening of
some ", I ernal" event is to be considered as a "condition precedent" or as a mere
'tim* of payn)ent" clause usually depends upon an interpretation of the listing
cmti -et as making or not making the occurrence of that event part of the re-
,juis f act of acceptance or as providing a condition to the offeror's performance.
For :n- cellent exaimple of proper iudicial handling of this situation, see Coughlan
& r,., tie. v. Frankel, 216 App. Div. 565, 215 N.Y. Supp. 625 (1st Dep't 1926),
ti f w,_ 243 N.Y. 599, 154 N.E. 621 (1926). Compare text supported by notes
28,1 5 and 83 siuprca.
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silentio, Corbin's analysis recognizing that there may be "conditions"
in an offer for a unilateral contract in addition to the act of per-
formance required by the offer,93 "act of performance" for our pur-
poses referring to obtaining a purchaser. That is, the New York courts
have recognized that, although a commission has been earned, pay-
ment may be independently conditioned. However valuable this
analysis may be in another context, the existence of the provision
that commission shall not be deemed earned unless or until the named
event has occurred would seem to render such an analysis inappro-
priate at this point.
Reference has already been made to interpretation of brokerage
agreements employing the simple term "payable when." Other lan-
gnage is commonly coupled with that term-e.g., "if" and "as."
Where all are coupled together, as, "commissions are payable if, as
and when" a stated event occurs, there is no question but that a
"condition" has been stated,94 and there has' likewise been no trouble
experienced by the courts in finding that a combination of any two
of these terms serves the same purpose. 95 This is true regardless of
the time in the sequence of events at which the provision is first ex-
pressed, if such provision is supported by consideration. Another
term that has led to the same result is "actually"-payment shall be
made when some event "actually" occurs. 0 Of course, use of the term
93. 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 626 (1951).
94. Rothschild v. Jerome Park Realty Corp., 71 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd,
272 App. Div. 1044, 75 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1st Dep't 1947) (combined with the term
"actually"); Spero v. Kobler, 245 App. Div. 643, 283 N.Y. Supp. 791 (1st Dep't
1935) ; Leder v. Dry Dock Savings Institution, 8 N.Y.S.2d 68 (N.Y. City Ct. 1938).
95. Stern v. Gepo Realty Corp., 289 N.Y. 274, 45 N.E.2d 440 (1942) ("when
and if consummated"); Colvin v. Post Mortgage and Land Co., 225 N.Y. 510, 122
N.E. 454 (1919) ("as and when"); Coward v. McLaughlin, 100 N.Y.S.2d 444 (N.
Y. Munic. Ct. 1950) ("only if and when"); cf. Reichard v. Wallach, 91 N.Y. Supp.
347 (Sup. Ct., App. T. 1904) ("brokerage will be paid only to the one who actually
makes and finally completes the sale and has the contract signed") ; Van Varick
v. Suburban Investment Co., 76 Misc. 593, 135 N.Y. Supp. 299 (Sup. Ct. 1912)(commissions from "installments actually received"). It would seem that the
Stern and Coward opinions had been anticipated by the court in Levy v. Forster,224 App. Div. 463, 231 N.Y. Supp. 238 (1st Dep't 1928) when it had suggested
that the term "when" might have been used in an "if" sense.
96. Larson v. Burroughs, 131 App. Div. 877, 116 N.Y. Supp. 358 (2d Dep't1909); cf. Reichard v. Wallach 91 N.Y. Supp. 347 (Sup. Ct., App. T. 1904).
See also Rothschild v. Jerome Park Realty Corp., 71 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct.),
aff'd, 272 App. Div. 1044, 75 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1st Dep't 1947) ("actually" combined
with "as, if, and when").
In Altman v. Heller, 127 N.Y.S.2d 129 (Sup. Ct. 1953) will be found the ex-
treme of protection-seeking: "only when, as and if and in the event title actually
closes, at which time the said brokerage commissions shall be due and payable."
Cf. Heller & Henretig, Inc. v. 3620-168th Street, Inc., 274 App. Div. 1007, 84
N.Y.S.2d 767 (2d Dep't 1948) ("if for any reason whatsoever the contract of
sale shall not be executed and delivered as aforesaid, or if the title shall not be
closed and the deed be delivered under the contract of sale for any reason whatso-
ever except for the willful default of the seller, the undersigned hereby agrees
that there shall be no brokerage or compensation due").
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in combination with "unless" or "until" clearly states a condition.97
Suppose the phrase refers to payment to be made upon receipt by the
property owner of certain payments which are to be made under a
contract executed between the listing owner and a purchaser. Obvi-
ously the same result should, and in fact does, obtain,98 although, just
as obviously, the broker is entitled to any commissions due on pay-
ments actually made.- '
Just as was true in New Jersey, a provision that commissions are
to be "dute and payable" has been employed, although usually in con-
nection with some other term connoting a condition.100 In Couper v.
O''eil1," however, the supreme court emphasized that an isolated
provision of a commission agreement executed simultaneously with
a contract of sale, which related to an event at the occurrence of
which payment of the commission would be due, created a "condition
precedent" to the earning of commissions. Inasmuch as the term is
most likely used as a synonym for "earned," the decision seems sound.
Specifically with regard to the effect of words of "conditional"
import, the New York decisions, unlike those of New Jersey,'0 2 are
noteworthy for their direct consideration of the time in the chrono-
logical sequence of events at which the "conditional" language was
inserted. The jural effect of such consideration is clearly demon-
strable by a comparison of two cases. In the appellate division opinion
!07. Williams v. Ashner, 152 App. Div. 447, 137 N.Y. Supp. 275 (2d Dep't
1912); Murray R. Realty Co., Inc. v. Manhattan Co., 162 Misc. 21, 293 N.Y. Supp.
605, af if med. 251 App. Div. 717, 298 N.Y. Supp. 176 (1st Dep't 1937) ; of. Green-
wald v. Rosen, 61 Misc. 260, 113 N.Y. Supp. 764 (Sup. Ct., App. T. 1908) ("no
commissions are to be paid until the title is passed; if for any reason title cannot
be passed no commissions are to be paid whatever").
98. See, e.g., North Sea Developments, Inc. v. Burnett, 254 N.Y. 374, 173 N.E.
228 (1930); Colvin v. Post Mortgage and Land Co., 225 N.Y. 510, 122 N.E. 454
(1919); Van Varick v. Suburban Investment Co., 76 Misc. 593, 135 N.Y. Supp.
299 (Sup. Ct. 1912); cf. Fuller v. Bradley Contracting Co., 183 App. Div. 6, 20,
170 N.Y. Supp. 320, 328 (2d Dep't 1918), aff'd memr., 229 N.Y. 605, 129 N.E. 925
(1920) (dictum); Jaffe v. New York Towers, Inc., 108 N.Y.S.2d 193 (N.Y. City
Ct. 1951). But cf. Traylor v. Crucible Steel Co., 192 App. Div. 445, 183 N.Y.
Supp. 181 (1st Dep't 1920), aff'd, 232 N.Y. 583, 134 N.E. 581 (1922) (dictum).
99. Van Varick v. Suburban Investment Co., 76 Misc. 593, 135 N.Y. Supp. 299
(Sup. Ct. 1912); cf. Gilder v. Davis, 137 N.Y. 504, 33 N.E. 599 (1893) (where
commission was not to be paid "until the final purchase money is paid in," the
broker was entitled, at least, to commission based upon the amount of the sum
forfeited to the property owner upon the purchaser's default). But compare the
Gilder decision with Anies v. Wesnofske, 255 N.Y. 156, 174 N.E. 436 (1931).
10. See, e.q., Couper v. O'Neill, 53 Misc. 319, 103 N.Y. Supp. 122 (Sup. Ct.
1907) ("shall not be due and payable until"); cf. Finnegan & Di Zerega, Inc. v.
Bank of New York, 277 App. Div. 562, 101 N.Y.S.2d 322 (1st Dep't 1950), aff'd,
302 N.Y. 876, 100 N.E.2d 53 (1951); Fuller v. Bradley Contracting Co., 183 App.
Div. 6, 170 N.Y. Supp. 320 (2d Dep't 1918), aff'd, 229 N.Y. 605, 129 N.E. 925
(1920) ("due and payable only as and when .. .we receive payment"); Jaffe v.
New York Towers, Inc., 108 N.Y.S.2d 193 (N.Y. City Ct. 1951).
101. 53 Misc. 319, 103 N.Y. Supp. 122 (Sup. Ct. 1907).
102. See text at pp. 303-04 supra.
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in North Sea Development, Inc. v. Burnett,13 the court set forth the
basic distinction by referring to the problem and its conclusion thus,
There can be no doubt that, under the well-established rule laid
down in Colvin v. Post Mortgage & Land Co., [225 N.Y. 510,
122 N.E. 454 (1919)] the plaintiff is entitled to full commissions
unless the proof shows that the owner and the broker, prior to
the time the contract of sale was made, agreed that the broker
was to receive commissions only upon payments made under
the contract.0 4  (Emphasis added.)
And, in Eclhaus v. Paramount Improvement Corp.,-' it was specifi-
cally held that an agreement to wait for commissions made after the
owner and purchaser have agreed upon a sale was a mere nullity.
The Colvin case, relied upon by the North Sea opinion, was expressly
distinguished on the ground that the "conditional" agreement there
involved had been made before the broker had performed the required
act of acceptance.0 6
An excellent statement of the law concerning the co-operation and
duties required of a listing owner as it then existed (and as the sub-
stance of it continues to exist), coupled with a good analysis of the
appropriateness of the various decisions in light of the business set-
ting in which brokerage agreements are executed, being readily
103. 228 App. Div. 444, 239 N.Y. Supp. 634 (2d Dep't 1930).
104. Id. at 448, 239 N.Y. Supp. at 637. The appellate division decision was
reversed on appeal, 254 N.Y. 374, 173 N.E. 228 (1930), by a holding that "whether
before the broker had earned any commissions he agreed that his compensation
should be [based on payments to be made under the contract]," the decision of
which question would be decisive, was a question of fact.
105. 240 App. Div. 778, 265 N.Y. Supp. 1055 (2d Dep't 1933).
106. Other cases finding consideration for "conditional" language, though first
enunciated after the broker had begun his efforts: Saum v. Capital Realty Devel-
opment Corp., 268 N.Y. 335, 197 N.E. 303 (1935) (broker had not yet performed
the required act); Couper v. O'Neill, 53 Misc. 319, 103 N.Y. Supp. 122 (Sup. Ct.
1907) (same); cf. Silberman v. Horowitz, 114 N.Y. Supp. 1 (Sup. Ct., App. T.
1909) (dispute over commissions due provided consideration). And see Seymour
v. St. Luke's Hospital, 28 App. Div. 119, 50 N.Y. Supp. 989 (1st Dep't 1898),
appeal dismissed, 159 N.Y. 524, 53 N.E. 1132 (1899) (although the court indi-
cated a question concerning the consideration for the special agreement, the
broker, by suing on it, was estopped to dispute its validity).
Other cases finding that, the broker having performed the required act, the
commission was earned and the subsequent "conditional" agreement relating to
payment was without consideration: John Reis Co. v. Zimmerli, 224 N.Y. 351, 120
N.E. 692 (1918); Miller v. Rossiter and Bankers' Trust Co., 125 Misc. 80, 209
N.Y. Supp. 767 (1st Dep't 1925); Salmon v. Mayer, 164 N.Y. Supp. 766 (1st Dep't
1917) ; Swee v. Neumann, 67 Misc. 605, 123 N.Y. Supp. 776 (N.Y. City Ct. 1910)(the common case of the listing owner attempting to "whittle down" an already
successful broker); Taubenblatt v. Galewski, 108 N.Y. Supp. 588 (Sup. Ct., Ap
T. 1908) ; Hough v. Baldwin, 50 Misc. 546, 99 N.Y. Supp. 545 (Sup. Ct., App. T.
1906); Gilder v. Davis, 137 N.Y. 504, 509, 33 N.E. 599, 600 (1893) (dictum);
of. Moskowitz v. Hornberger,20 Misc. 558, 46 N.Y. Supp. 462 (Sup. Ct., App. T.
1897). But of. Nekarda v. Presberger, 123 App. Div. 418, 107 N.Y. Supp. 897
1st Dep't 1908) where, notwithstanding an acknowledgment that the listing
owner had become indebted to a broker who had brought about a contract between
the owner and a purchaser, an agreement to pay upon the happening of a certain
event was considered effective to provide a condition precedent. Compare textsupported by note 83 supra.
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available, ' 7 little more than a brief statement of the pertinent prob-
lems will be presented.' Here, again, the basic decision is Amies v.
Wesnofske, where, after quoting from various authorities concerning
excuse of a condition precedent where the promisor has prevented or
hindered its occurrence, the court says,
[A] etive conduct of the conditional promisor ... eliminates [the
condition] and makes the promise absolute. No such doctrine
can be efficacious to compel positive action by the promisor to
bring about performance of the condition....
It has been very generally held that a vendor is under no duty
to his broker to enforce specific performance by the vendee, when
conmissions are conditioned upon performance; that the vendor
may accept forfeiture by the vendee, retain the down payment
made, and not become liable thereby to pay his broker.109
Breaking this statement into its component ideas, we have first
the proposition that where active conduct of the conditional vendor
hi nders performance the condition is excused. But what if the con-
duct is passhc or somewhere between the two? Is there any under-
taking that will be impliedly attributed to the property owner? More
specifically, what about Stern v. Gepo Realty Corp.,110 the opinion of
which said, "a vendor of real property is under a duty to take affirma-
tive action to convey a marketable title .. ., and, therefore, under the
usual contract of sale, undertakes to pay off items which are con-
cediedly liens . . ."-how is it to be reconciled? Disposing of the
latter question first, the obvious point of departure between the
situations involved in the Stern and Avzies cases lies in an apprecia-
tion of "whose fault" caused defeat of the occurrence of the condi-
tional event. As was specifically observed in Stern, the Amies lan-
guage dealt with the situation where the purchaser was at fault-in
such a situation there was no duty cast on the owner to take affirma-
tive action to protect the broker. But in Stern the fault was the
listing owner's-his title was defective. This distinction, while not
expressly enunciated in the At oes decision, had been made explicit
in earlier New York cases", and had been pointed out in a discussion
107. Note, Spes,,;al Coutdtionv in Real Estate Brokerage Contracts, 32 COLUM.
L. Rrv. 1194, 1197-1204 (1932).
108. A rather more complete discussion of this facet of the problem as handled
by the New Jersey courts (see text at § II (b) supra) was thought necessary
to illustrate, "nter alia, that adoption of a "time" rationale in "when payable"
cases has not affected the New Jersey handling of "fault" in "condition" cases.
10o. 2°5 N.Y. at 163, 174 N.E. at 438 (1931).
110. 289 N.Y. 274, 277, 45 N.E.2d 440, 441, affirmbng 264 App. Div. 265, 35
N.Y.S.2d 240 (1st Dep't 1942).
111. Sce, e.q., Colvin v. Post Mortgage and Land Co., 225 N.Y. 510, 122 N.E.
454 (1919); Weiner v. Infeld, 116 Misc. 323, 190 N.Y. Supp. 82 (2d Dep't 1921);
Larsoen v. Burroughs, 131 App. Div. 877, 116 N.Y. Supp. 358 (2d Dep't 1909).
The same result obtains where there has been a supervening impossibility. Green-
wald v. Rosen, 61 Misc. 260, 113 N.Y. Supp. 764 (Sup. Ct., App. T. 1908); ef.
Louheel & Co. v. Suzuki, 216 App. Div. 487, 215 N.Y. Supp. 505 (1st Dep't),
af',, 243 N.Y. 648, 154 N.E. 642 (1926).
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of the "implied warranty" of title given by the mere fact an owner
has listed property for sale.
1 12
Of course, the foregoing discussion is but a specific facet of the
broader second question-is there any implied "undertaking" by the
property owner? This question is, in turn, directly related to the
first-"active" versus "passive"-question. Having found that the
New York courts say "yes" insofar as title is concerned, have they
stopped there? Suppose the purchaser seeks to relieve himself of his
obligations under the contract and the listing owner agrees to a
cancellation? Following the distinction already indicated, the answer,
depends upon whether the listing owner's cancellation is considered
as active or passive. If the cancellation takes place before the sched-
uled law day and before the purchaser has defaulted, the cancellation
makes the completion of the contract impossible and is a breach of
the listing owner's implied undertaking to do nothing to defeat the
occurrence of the named event. 1 3 On the other hand, if the purchaser
defaults, so that the transaction is no longer "living," the owner may
cancel with impunity.1 4 Further, he is under no duty to enforce his
112. Compare the New Jersey approach at text supported by notes 71-73
supra.
The following New York cases also enunciate the implied warranty of title
doctrine: Colvin v. Post Mortgage and Land Co., supr note 111; Magrill v.
Langan, 43 N.Y.S.2d 210 (2d Dep't 1943); Weiner v. Infeld, supra note 111;
Morgan v. Calvert, 126 App. Div. 327, 110 N.Y. Supp. 855 (2d Dep't 1908);
Coward v. McLaughlin, 100 N.Y.S.2d 444 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1950); Cash v. Dia-
mond, 208 Misc. 712, 714, 144 N.Y.S.2d 627, 630 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1955) (dictum);
Green v. Foreman, 53 N.Y.S.2d 863, 866 (Sup. Ct 1945) (dictum); cf. Holman
v. Patten, 227 N.Y. 22, 124 N.E. 86, rehearing denied, 227 N.Y. 623, 125 N.E. 913(1919); Moskowitz v. Hornberger, 20 Misc. 558, 46 N.Y. Supp. 462 (Sup. Ct.,
App. T. 1897) (exchange). But cf. Condict v. Cowdrey, 139 N.Y. 273, 34 N.E.
781 (1893) (although the owner's title was defective, where the purchaser had
expressly reserved the right to withdraw should the owner's title be bad, the
broker, not having secured an unconditionally binding contract, had not performed
his undertaking and so was not entitled to commission); Hausman v. Fierdtfelder,
81 App. Div. 46, 80 N.Y. Supp. 1039 (1st Dep't 1903); Traylor v. Crucible Steel
Co., 192 App. Div. 445, 449, 183 N.Y. Supp. 181, 183 (lst Dep't 1920), aff'd, 232
N.Y. 583, 134 N.E. 581 (1922) (dictum).
In Leder v. Dry Dock Savings Institution, 8 N.Y.S.2d 68 (N.Y. City Ct. 1938)
the court was presented with a brokerage claim where the transaction failed be-
cause the listed property encroached one-half inch upon a building line. In direct-
ing a verdict for the defendant-property owner, the court, its sympathies going
out to an "innocent" owner, said:
If title was clearly marketable, then there was no fault on the part of the
defendant and there can be no recovery .... If clearly unmarketable, and
the defendant had failed to communicate the basic facts to the broker, the
plaintiff's contention is sound and he would be entitled to recover irrespec-
tive of "good faith" or the opposite on the part of the buyer ....
Id. at 69.
See Note, Special Conditions in Real Estate Brokerage Contracts, 32 CoLUIm.
L. Ray. 1194 (1932).
113. Cf. Frederick Zittel & Sons v. Schwartz, 192 App. Div. 353, 182 N.Y.
Supp. 638 (1st Dep't 1920) (sale of stock); Allan S. Feldman & Co. v. Freeman,
156 N.Y.S.2d 52 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1956).
114. Weiner v. Infeld, 116 Misc. 323, 190 N.Y. Supp. 82 (2d Dep't 1921).
Determination of who was at fault in defeat of the transaction is a juiy ques-
tion, Colvin v. Post Mortgage and Land Co., 225 N.Y. 510, 122 N.E. 454 (1919),
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rights to any deposit or claim he may have against the purchaser.
In the former situation the listing owner has been active in bringing
about defeat of the transaction; in the latter, only passive.-
Pursuing the "active-passive" distinction a bit further, the forego-
ing clearly indicates the truth of the Amies statement quoted above
that a listing owner need not pursue a recalcitrant purchaser with an
action for specific performance."' But can he compromise his claim
against the purchaser, or sue for or accept a payment of damages,
without incurring liability to the broker for the commission? Sup-
pose he does bring an action for specific performance? Suppose the
contract between owner and purchaser contains a provision for
th,- huiden of pleading and proof being on the broker to show that it was the
prrplety owner's. O'Connor-Sullivan, Inc. v. Otto, 283 App. Div. 269, 127
N.Y.S.d 373 (3d Dep't 1954); ef. Windsor Investing Corp. v. T. J. McLaughlin's
Sons, 1:3) Misc. 730, 225 N.Y. Supp. 7 (Sup. Ct. 1927), aff'd men., 224 App. Div.
715, 229 N.Y. Supp. 926 (1st Dep't 1928).
115. See, e.g., Spero v. Kobler, 245 App. Div. 643, 283 N.Y. Supp. 791 (1st
Dep't 1935); Seymour v. St. Luke's Hospital, 28 App. Div. 119, 50 N.Y. Supp.
989 (Ist Dep't 1898), appeal dimi .s'sed, 159 N.Y. 524, 53 N.E. 1132 (1899); cf.
Caidwell Co., Inc. v. Connecticut Mills Co., 225 App. Div. 270, 273-74, 232 N.Y.Supp. 625, 629 (1st Dep't 1929), ff'd, 251 N.Y. 565, 168 N.E. 429 (1929) ("It is
quite be ide the point for plaintiff to urge that, inasmuch as the defendant has
received the amount by which it -would have profited by performance of the agree-
ment, it should in good conscience pay the plaintiff what it would have had to
pay hin upon performance . . . . [Ilt was still perfectly competent for these
parties to contract that in no event should commissions be payable except upon
the price of goods actually shipped."); Hilsenrath v. Dale Holding Corp., 37
N.Y.S.2d 134, 136 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1942) (dictum).
Suppose upon a default by the purchaser the listing owner declares a for-
feiture, the purchaser sues for specific performance, and the owner settles the
suit. May the broker now maintain an action for commissions? Is the fact that
the purctaser changes his mind and attempts to enforce the contract sufficient
to icmovo the "fault" stigma from the purchaser and transfer it to the owner?
Set' Windsor Investing Corp. v. T. J. McLaughlin's Sons, 130 Misc. 730, 732, 225
N.Y. Supp. 7, 11 (Sup. Ct. 1927), aff'd mew., 224 App. Div. 715, 229 N.Y. Supp.
92f (Ist Dep't 1928) where it was said in a suit by a broker alleging that failure
of the transaction was due to the fault of the property owner in agreeing to a
settle nt,
It ha also been held that, where the purchaser defaults, but later demands
:t coveyance, which is refused by the vendor, the latter is not liable to a
1i o:oIr whose right to compensation was conditional upon passage of title.
I I0. Other cases enunciating the "active-passive" rationale include: Grenell
Realty Agency, Inc. v. Gruner, 63 N.Y.S.2d 443 (1st Dep't 1946) ; VMoffat v. Gerry
Estatc, Inc., 259 App. Div. 403, 19 N.Y.S.2d 579 (1st Dep't 1940); Coward v.
McLaughlin, 100 N.Y.S.2d 444 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1950); Leder v. Dry Dock Sav-
ings Institution, 8 N.Y.S.2d 68 (N.Y. City Ct. 1938); cf. Caldwell Co. v. Connec-
ticut Mflls Co., 225 App. Div. 270, 232 N.Y. Supp. 625 (1st Dep't 1929), wffd, 251
N.Y. 7.65, 168 N.E. 429 (1929); Fuller v. Bradley Constructing Co., 183 App. Div.
Ay. 170 N.Y. Supp. 320 (2d Dep't 1918). aff'd aem,., 229 N.Y. 605, 129 N.E. 925(1920). See also, Pearce v. Knepper, 53 N.Y.S.2d 845 (Sup. Ct. 1945), ajFd mer.,
2#h App. Div. 829, 56 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1945), appeal denied, 269 App. Div. 929,
57 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1st Dep't 1945).
117. In addition to the A,,des decision, see Stern v. Gepo Realty Corp., 289
N.Y. 274, 45 N.E.2d 440 (1942); Spero v. Kobler, 245 App. Div. 643, 283 N.Y.
Sujqp. 7,ti (Ist Dep't 1935); Seymour v. St. Luke's Hospital 28 A p. Div. 119,
50 N.Y. Supp. 989 (Lst Dep't 1898), appeal dismissed, 159 N.. 5243 N.E. 1132(1899) : Windsor Investing Corp. v. T. J. MTcLaughlin's Sons, 130 Vise. 730, 225
N.Y. Supp. 7 (Sup. Ct. 1927), aff'd. mew, 224 App. Div. 715, 229 N.Y. Supp. 926(1 .t Dep't. 1928).
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liquidated damages and the property owner receives the sum so spe-
cified? These questions raise the problem of "colorable equivalence,"118
but it is obvious that they are also directly related to the problem
of the owner's fault in non-satisfaction of the condition.
There is no doubt that when the owner has pursued a successful
action for specific performance, he has precluded a defense to liability
for commissions-his action amounts to a "colorable equivalence" of
the condition and it inures to the broker's benefit. 19 Nor, as shown
above, is there doubt of non-liability where the owner sits quietly by
on default by the purchaser. But suppose, in line with the questions
posed above, he makes an attempt that falls short of an action for
specific performance to gain some recompense for tribulation suffered
as a result of the purchaser's default? An action for specific per-
formance is obviously one of affirmance of the contract. So is the
recovery of damages for breach of the contract,120 but "affirmance"
does not necessarily require the bringing of suit.121 Cancellation or
rescission partake of rejection of the contract. What of modification?
It clearly is affirmative in nature. Is this enough to bring into opera-
tion the "specific performance" rule if the modification takes place
after default by the purchaser ?122 And what of foreclosure or collec-
tion of liquidated damages? Is this "affirmative"? In a sense the
answer is "yes," but in a more important sense it is "no." It is basing
a claim on the writing, but it is also an acknowledgment that the
primary obligation is no longer to be relied upon. Notwithstanding
characterization of such a claim as negative, however, may it never-
theless be said that recovery of liquidated damages or receipt of a
bid at a foreclosure sale is, in a real sense, the equivalent of the benefit
contemplated by the contract? "No," said the appellate division in
referring to the liquidated damages problem presented in Watson v.
Muskegon S. S. Corp., 123 distinguishing Gilder v. Davis,"42 which had
allowed recovery based on the amount of forfeiture (liquidated
118. See Note, 32 COLUm. L. RE V. 1194 (1932).
119. Id. at 1197, n.21.
120. See Amies v. Wesnofske, 255 N.Y. 156, 164, 174 N.E. 436, 438 (1931).
Coughlan & Co., Inc. v. Fr'ankel, 216 App. Div. 565, 215 N.Y. Supp. 625 (1st
Dep' t 1926), aff'd mem., 243 N.Y. 599, 154 N.E. 621 (1926), often cited in support
of this proposition, actually involved a situation where the broker's commission
was to be earned upon the securing of a binding contract and the court felt that,
where by suit the owner had secured damages for breach of a binder as a con-
tract, he was estopped to deny that the broker had earned a commission.
121. See Amies v. Wesnofske, supra note 120.
122. This was clearly answered in the affirmative by Hilsenrath v. Dale Hold-
ing Corp., 37 N.Y.S.2d 134 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1942) which, although involving
commissions for securing a lessee, relied upon "cases dealing with the purchase
and sale of real estate."
123. 208 App. Div. 158, 203 N.Y. Supp. 194 (1st Dep't 1924).
124. 137 N.Y. 504, 33 N.E. 599 (1893). While this case involved sale of a
steamship rather than of realty this factor did not enter into the decision-it
proceeded in the same manner as if sale of realty were involved.
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damages), on the ground that in that case the commission had been
earned by the signing of the contract.1- And the same answer is to
be found where foreclosure is pursued-a bid at a foreclosure sale
not being a payment made under the contract 2 1
This discussion of the New York cases began with a reference to
the two New York cases most heavily relied upon as adopting a
"time" rationale, Morgan v. Calvert and Meltzer v. Straus, and sug-
gested that the court in each instance may have felt that such an
analysis was the "easy" way to reach a "just" decision. Each of thosd
cases does specifically enunciate the "time" rationale, but each could
as well have been placed on excuse of a "condition"-Morgan v.
Calvert because a defect in the listing owner's title caused the non-
occurrence of the "condition," and Meltzer v. Straus because the list-
ing owner refused without justification to proceed at the law day.
Subsequent cases have shown a strong preference for the "condition"
rationale in all cases where an outside event has been stated in the
commission clause. But, as is shown by the opinion in Coughlan and
Co. v. Feankel,-- where it is clear that the provision for payment of
commissions does not refer to the broker's undertaking, the event
stated in such provision will be held to state a mere "time" of pay-
ment.-, This key to the acceptance of one of the rationales to the
exclusion of the other is further illustrated by the indulgence in
cross-citation to brokerage cases by opinions rendered in analogous
factual situations. Thus, in Mascioni v. I. B. Miller, Inc.,129 which
involved a subcontractor's claim to payment for materials furnished
the contractor under an agreement "Payment to be made as received
from the owner," the court, in part relying on brokerage cases, found
that a condition precedent had been stated. But in O'Neil Supply Co.
v. Pctroleum Heat & Power Co.131 where again a subcontractor was
claiming payment for supplies furnished, the court found that only
a "time" for payment had been stated. In both of these cases the
court referred to the distinction between a condition attached to the
existence of the debt itself, and a condition attached only to the
12.1. A probability recognized by the Gilder court, 137 N.Y. at 509, 33 N.E.
at 600-01, but not raised by that appeal.
126. North Sea Developments, Inc. v. Burnett, 254 N.Y. 374, 173 N.E. 228
(1930).
127. 216 App. Div. 565, 215 N.Y. Supp. 625 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 243 N.Y.
599. 154 N.E. 621 (1926).
128. The thrust of the Coaghlan decision was, however, somewhat weakened
by the alternative holding that the owner had received the equivalent of perform-
ance, and thus the broker was entitled. See note 120 supra.
129. 261 N.Y. 1, 184 N.E. 473 (1933). Cf. Ley v. Fred T. Ley & Co., 271 App.
Div. 439, 65 N.Y.S.2d 843 (Sup Ct., App. T. 1946) ("agreement... to make pay-
ments... from a particular fund to be realized in the future, if based on a con-
uideration," usually makes "realization of the fund ... a condition precedent to
any liability of the promisor to make the pa-ment.")
130. 280 N.Y. 50, 19 N.E.2d 676 (1939).
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promise to pay. The Mascioni case, quoting from Professor Langdell,
acknowledged that "a condition annexed to a promise to pay a debt
will commonly . . . extend to the debt itself,"13' and concluded that
the promise to pay then before the court was not intended to be opera-
tive should the event stated not occur. That is, it was felt that the
payment clause constituted a proviso that the debt should be payable
only upon receipt of payments by the owner. Thus, it was then held
that the trial court had not been in error in reasoning that the sub-
contractors "had accepted the condition as a material part of the
exchange for their own promise or performance." 13 2
In the O'Neil Supply Co. case, however, there had been previous dif-
ficulties which had led to a compromise agreement between the plain-
tiff and defendant by which the plaintiff relinquished certain rights in
exchange for defendant's promise to pay a certain sum "five days
after the completion of the installation" by a named third person.1 33
The defendant completed the job after the third person had failed to
do so. In holding for the plaintiff who was claiming payment for ma-
terials furnished, the court determined that "The promise of de-
fendant to pay was independent of the completion of the work by
[the third person] individually, the time of payment being based
alone on the happening of the condition stated."'134 This result was
based in part on the relinquishment of rights by the plaintiff against
the third person in exchange for a right against the defendant (which
the court felt showed clearly an intention by the plaintiff to have an
absolute obligation of the defendant without reference to the third
person). It was also based in part on the lack of pecuniary interest
of the plaintiff in the completion of the work by the named third per-
son individually; only the defendant could compel the third person's
performance. The importance of this latter clause must not be over-
looked, for the court, in ascertaining the parties' intention, felt that
Plaintiff could not have understood the contract to provide that
payment would be conditioned upon the whim or caprice or fail-
ure of defendant to show good faith or to exercise due diligence in
effecting the completion of the work.'35
As a result, the court concluded that
If the completion of the work by [the named third person] indi-
vidually was a condition precedent to any payment at all to plain-
tiff, if the debt itself was contingent, the defendant cannot rely
on the condition precedent to prevent recovery where the non-
131. LANGDELL, SUIMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 36 (1880).
132. 261 N.Y. at 6, 184 N.E. at 474.
133. 280 N.Y. at 53, 19 N.E.2d at 677.
134. 280 N.Y. at 54, 19 N.E.2d at 678.
135. 280 N.Y. at 55, 19 N.E.2d at 678.
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performance of the condition was caused or consented to by t
self, .
Thus, here again, we see that while the "time" rationale is not com-
pletely rejected by the New York courts, its application normally rests
upon a finding that extreme hardship may result to the promisee if a
Scondition" is indulged. And here again we see the import of the
"fault" of the promisor, ,;
The result of the acceptance of one or the other of the rationales
has previously been indicated.s By their preference for the "condi-
tion" rationale as shown by their failure to find an absolute promise
to pay divorced from the statement of an outside event, the New York
courts have chosen a path which results in decisions affording a maxi-
mum of protection to a property owner.
IV. GENERAL
() Q'llafyizg Brokerage Language
The preceding sections have been involved with discussion of the
hldings of the two states generally considered most representative of
judicial attitudes toward the effect of qualifying language relating to
payment of commissions, and we have seen that any absolute charac-
terization of either the New York or New Jersey decisions is un-
warranted. The present section will concern itself with a brief analy-
sis of the attitudes of the courts of the other American jurisdictions
which, as was observed in the introduction, most usually, although
nefither exclusively nor wholly consistently, accord with the "condi-
tion" preference of the New York decisions. Although occasional ref-
erence to the nature of the broker's undertaking 9 in pursuance of a
listing unembellished by qualifying language having reference to the
pay nent of commissions has been and will of necessity be made in
furtherance of the objectives of this paper, such problems are ex-
cluded from detailed consideration so that we do not detract from our
central consideration-the effect of such "qualifying payment" Ian-
guage.,
I.G. 280 N.Y. at 56, 19 N.E.2d at 679.
137. Consider the query concerning the New Jersey adoption of the "time"
rationale at text following note 60 supra.
138. See text at pp. 809-10 supra.
139. The most thorough discussion of these problems is to be found in Professor
Flayd Mechem's masterful treatise. See 2 MECHEI, AGENCY §§ 2427-79 (2d. ed.
1914). It is the writer's intention to prepare a discussion of the problems con-
nected with special "undertakings" for later publication.
Exemplary of words referring directly to the broker's undertaking are "to sell"
and the various forms of the term "sale."
140. Included under the "general listing" category by definition, is the require-
ment that the broker secure a purchaser ready, willing, and able to buy on the4special" terms imposed by the listing owner. As was said In Lelht-Beonson
Realty & Construction Coi v . 1. Stone & Co,, 188 Va. 511, 514, MSt S.E. 883,
81-85 (1924) ;
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Before embarking on a consideration of judicial handling of such
phrases outside of New Jersey and New York it will be well to repeat
that, whatever construction is adopted in a particular case, the de-
cisional court is always attempting to base its interpretation of the
listing agreement on the intention of the parties-did they intend to
place a condition precedent to the broker's right to commission? The
litigious problems arise because there is often no mutual intention in
fact. With this in mind, what considerations enter into the actual
determination of the legal effect of the "payment" clause? And, does
a listing owner, whose "intention" is given effect when the qualifying
language used is treated as establishing a "condition precedent," actu-
ally intend, at the moment of listing, to make such a condition?
Of primary importance in this connection should be the problem
whether the qualifying language is entitled to any jural effect. Where
the language is part of an agreement executed prior to the rendering
of performance it will of course be given effect in some way as a part
of the listing agreement. 14' But should this be true where the perti-
nent qualifying language is first enunciated simultaneously with or
subsequent to the rendering of the required act of performance? One
may rightly wonder how an affirmative answer could be given-where
is the consideration for such an agreement ?142 As was pointed out
One distinction which seems sometimes to be overlooked is as to the
specific character of the employment. If the broker is employed generally
to find a purchaser, and introduces him to the owner, and they negotiate a
sale, the broker is entitled to his commissions; but a different rule applies,
or should apply, when the terms of the sale or exchange are specifically fixed
in advance, and the broker's authority is limited to finding a purchaser who
will buy the property on the prescribed terms. In the latter instance, in the
absence of deceit or fraud on the part of the owner, the broker is entitled
to no commissions, unless he finds such a purchaser ....
While a listing agreement employing such "special" terms is often referred
to as a "special contract of employment," [see, e.g., Campbell v. Sickels, 197 Va.
298, 89 S.E.2d 14 (1955)] such an agreement does not come within the definition
of "special contract" as that term has been defined herein. See text at note 3
supra. Rephrasing that definition, the term "special contract (agreement)" re-
fers, in the absence of specific reference otherwise, to provisions of the listing
agreement that specify some event external to the requirement of finding a pur-
chaser, at the happening of which the commission will be paid. Is the reference
to such event merely a statement of the "time" at which the commission will be
paid, or is the occurrence of that event a "condition precedent" to a listing owner's
obligation to pay?
141. This includes the situation where the qualifying language first finds ex-
pression in an instrument executed separate from, but simultaneous with, execu-
tion of a listing agreement designating the broker's undertaking. See, e.g., Malone
v. Dillard, 212 Ala. 361, 102 So. 705 (1925); Canton v. Thomas, 264 Mass. 457,
162 N.E. 769 (1928); of. Dowler v. Suburban Improvement Co., 110 W. Va. 113,
157 S.E. 91 (1931).
142. Use of the phrase "rendering of the required act of performance" in the
preceding sentence is meant to provide the underlying assumption of this discus-
sion that the broker has secured a purchaser on the prescribed terms. Of course,
if a prospective purchaser proposes to buy the property on different terms, accep-
tance by the owner of what would in effect be a counter-offer would provide
consideration for a change in the brokerage agreement. See, e.g., Dale v. Raines,
115 Cal. App.2d 309, 252 P.2d 22 (1953); Alison v. Chapman, 36 Cal. App. 759,
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earlier," 3 many courts have simply by-passed the problem without
acknowledgment that a problem existed.144 Others, including New
Jersey 45 and New York, 146 have given effect to the provision as a
"time" clause as that term is employed in this paper.147 Inasmuch as
the later listing is in many instances in writing, whereas the first is
often oral, courts may have recognized the problem in a given case
but glossed over it by an unexpressed finding that the subsequent
writing "integrated" the earlier parol.141 Other cases have involved
173 Pac. 389 (1918); Dean v. Williams, 56 Wash. 614 106 Pac. 130 (1910);
Estate of Boley, 211 Wis. 431, 248 N.W. 452 (1933); ej. *addle v. Smith, 58 Ind.
App. 587, 108 N.E. 537 (1915) (broker importuned listing owner to forego en-
forcement of an original contract and accept another). The same rule is appli-
cable where the broker secures a purchaser after the listing has expired.
Similarly, if a listing owner has not provided the broker with definite terms
on which a sale will be made, the terms are open to negotiation and the owner
may refuse to accept such terms as are agreeable to the prospective purchaser
until and unless the broker assents to the imposition of a condition precedent to
the owner's obligation to pay commissions. See, e.g., Dal Maso v. Gregory, 112
A.2d 923 (D.C. Munic. App. 1955); cf. Edgecomb v. Callahan, 132 Cal. App. 248,
22 P.2d 521 (1933).
143. See text supported by notes 27, 102-06 supra.
144. See, e.g., Smith v. Sharp Real Estate Co., 200 Ala. 666, 77 So. 40 (1917);
Smith v. Post, 167 Cal. 69, 138 Pac. 705 (1914); Teague v. Adair Realty & Loan
Co., 92 Ga. App. 463, 88 S.E.2d 795 (1955); cf. Langford v. King Lumber & Mfg.
Co., 123 Fla. 855, 167 So. 817 (1935); Crichton v. Halliburton & Moore, 154 Miss.
265, 122 So. 200 (1929); Hersch v. Kelman, 61 Ohio L. Abs. 363, 104 N.E.2d 35(1951). Compare the Hersch opinion, supra, with that in Swee v. Neuman, 67
Misc. 605, 123 N.Y. Supp. 776 (N.Y. City Ct. 1910). And compare the supreme
court opinion in Edwards v. Billow, 31 Cal. 2d 350, 188 P.2d 748 (1948) with the
appellate division opinion, 180 P.2d 428 (Cal. App. 1947).
The textual discussion has not been intended as an indication that under no
circumstances has a court refused, for lack of consideration, to give jural effect
to a subsequent commission agreement. See, e.g., Lipton v. Johansen, 105 Cal.
App. 2d 363, 233 P.2d 648 (1951); United Sales Agency v. Luck Land Co., 154
Minn. 332, 191 N.W. 897 (1923); Neff v. Schrader, 49 N.D. 213, 191 N.W. 466(1922); Rosenfeld v. Bobb, 80 Pa. Super. 280 (1922); Clark v. Battaglia, 47 Pa.
Super. 290 (1911); cf. Clark v. Dulien Steel Products, 54 Cal. App. 2d 92, 128
P.2d 608 (1942). Bat cf. Mearkle v. Kellerman, 82 Pa. Super. 11 (1923).
145. See text supported by notes 26-27 supra.
146. Coughlan & Co. v. Frankel, 216 App. Div. 565, 215 N.Y. Supp. 625 (1st
Dep't 1926).
147. See text at note 3, and note 140 supra.
148. This rationalization would be especially appropriate where the contract
between the property owner and the purchaser contains the first written reference
to commissions. This has been expressly recognized in some decisions. See, e.g.,
Riggs v. Brock, 208 Ark. 1050, 189 S.W.2d 367 (1945); Lane v. Smith, 179 Ark.
533, 17 S.W.2d 319 (1929) ; Coulter v. Howard, 203 Cal. 17, 262 Pac. 751 (1927) ;
Blount v. Freeman. 94 Ga. App. 110. 93 S.E.2d 820 (1956); cf. J. H. Hillman &
Co. v. Joseph Joseph & Bros., 9 Pa. Super. 1 (1898). See also Dal Maso v. Greg-
ory, 112 A 2d 923 (D.C. Munic. App. 1955). In each of the foregoing cases the
rationale was expressly utilized.
A similar situation is presented when the applicable statute of frauds requires
a written memorial of the listing "agreement, e.g., WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5825(1931), and the agreement between the broker and seller is first reduced to writ-
ing after execution of a contract of sale between the seller and purchaser. Two
variations need to be considered. If the oral agreement between the broker and
seller would be construed to contain a condition precedent to the seller's duty to
pay (for example, the execution of a contract of sale between the seller and pur-
chaser), the subsequent writing spelling out such a condition would in no way
change the terms of the oral agreement. It is clear in such a situation that the
writing serves merely as a memorial of the oral agreement, and no problem of
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the action of a volunteer-no earlier commission agreement exist-
ing. 49 Either of these situations may, of course, have been the "sub
silentio" reasoning of the courts which have not expressed an aware-
ness of the problem.
Assuming that such language is entitled to some effect, however,
which rationale, "time" or "condition precedent," is in fact the more
often used, and which is to be preferred? If the term "time" is em-
ployed by a particular decisional court, is it done with the legal sig-
nificance attached to the term by the New Jersey courts or that
sometimes assigned to it by the New York courts ?15o And, if the term
"condition precedent" is used, to which event, earning of commission
or payment thereof, does it relate?151 These questions will provide the
grist for this and the concluding section. To facilitate the discussion,
reference will be made by introductory clauses to specific provisions
by which the payment of commissions is keyed to an external event.
This will be followed by a discussion and analysis of the judicial ap-
proach to such provisions.
consideration is present. 2 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 503 (1950). If, however, the
oral agreement did not contain such a condition, and the subsequent writing did
contain such a term, the problem of consideration is present, but is answered by
finding that the seller's consent to execution of the memorial, something he was
under no legal obligation to give, constitutes consideration for the broker's consent
to a change in the terms of the seller's promise to pay. Sams v. Olympia Holding
Co., 153 Wash. 254, 279 Pac. 575 (1929). The Sams case also stated that,
A contract to pay a broker's commission, unenforcible under the statute of
frauds because resting in parol, may become, under certain circumstances,
a moral obligation which is sufficient consideration to support a subsequent
written agreement to pay a specified sum of money.
Id. at 257, 279 Pac. at 576. See also Coulter v. Howard, 203 Cal. 17, 262 Pac.
751 (1927). In many cases where this factor is present no express recogni-
tion is given. See, e.g., Gaut v. Dunlap, 188 S.W. 1020 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
149. See, e.g., Peak v. Jurgens, 5 Cal. App. 2d 573, 43 P.2d 569 (1935) ; Richeson
v. Wilson, 187 Va. 536, 47 S.E.2d 393 (1948); Dowler v. Suburban Improvement
Co., 110 W. Va 113 157 S.E. 91 (1931); of. Cochran v. Ellsworth, 272 P.2d 904(Cal. App. 1954). And see Baird v. Gleckler, 11 S.D. 233, 76 N.W. 931 (1898);
Porizky v. United Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 178 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
In Preston v. Postel, 300 Fed. 134 (S.D. Tex. 1922), the broker had originally
acted under an employment agreement but had failed to satisfy the property
owner. Later the owner entered a contract with a purchaser to whom he had
originally been introduced by the broker. Simultaneously the owner executed a
commission agreement with the broker providing for payment "as soon as said
sale . . . shall have been consummated." In finding that such provided a "condi-
tion" to payment the court relied in part on the fact that there was a dispute
between the owner and broker concerning the earning or nonearning of commis-
sion as a result of the prior acts of the broker. Assuming such dispute to have
been bona fide, it would seem that there was consideration for a statement of a
"condition." No "acknowledgment" would be involved even though the commis-
sion agreement contained reference to the past acts of the broker. See Silberman
v. Horowitz, 114 N.Y. Supp. 1 (Sup. Ct., App. T. 1909).
150. See text supported by notes 82-85 supra. Other courts have also used the
dual concept applied by the New York courts. See note 176 infra and text sup-
ported thereby.
151. Ibid.
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1. Commission will be paid when (at the time of; on; upon; as; at;
after) . ..
The statement of multiple terms employed here is an attempt to in-
clude under a single heading all terms used to introduce payment
clauses which have, in some decision or decisions by some court or
courts, been interpreted as providing a "time" of payment only. It is
where such terms are used that a variance in interpretation as pro-
viding for a "time" of payment or a "condition precedent" thereto is
not only most likely to be indulged in by the courts but is justified in
theory. In the absence of serious ambiguity in the terms themselves
or in the contractual setting in which they appear, their meaning is
for the court."- Are the terms by which this section is introduced
ambiguous in this sense? Assuming for present purposes that they
are not, how have the courts treated them?
The influence of Professor Williston's treatise has been tremendous
in the entire contract field, and treatment of the terms presently under
consideration has been strongly influenced by section 671 thereof,
where it is said,
A great variety of words are now regarded as . . .fit for the
creation of a condition. . . . Such words as "when," "while,"
"after," or "as soon as," clearly indicate that the promise is not
to be performed except upon a condition. 15 3 (Emphasis added.)
As has already been noted, 54 an earlier edition of this text was
strongly relied on by the opinion in Amies v. Wesnofske, and that
opinion has in turn exerted authoritative influence over many subse-
quent decisions throughout the country. Thus, the influence of Profes-
sor Williston has been felt by both direct and indirect reliance.
On the other hand, Webster's International Dictionary is not so
categorical in its definitions of the terms specified in the introduction.
Thus, "when" is defined, inter alia, as meaning "at what time," "on
what occasion," "how soon," "at which time," "at the same time or
moment that," and "whereupon" ;1 "on" is defined "in continuance or
succession" ;,' "upon" as meaning "with little or no interval after"
and "by means of"; ,1 "as" to mean "to that or the same extent; in
152. Because such interpretation is for the court the majority of judicial state-
ments declare that the meaning of the words used is a "matter of law." See, e.g.,
cases cited in note 11 supra. But a more careful analysis acknowledges that, while
the interpretation of such words is, in the absence of doubt as to the meaning
intended to be conveyed by their use, a matter for the court, such interpretation is
a "question of fact." See 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 554 (1951). Compare text sup-
ported by notes 155-63 infra. See text supported by notes 198-205 infra.
153. 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 671 (rev. ed. 1936). Emphasis was added to
demonstrate that Professor Williston did not, as the decisions have assumed, state
that such words created a condition per se.
154. See note 87 supra.
155. MERRIAM-WEBSTER, NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2910 (2d ed. 1954).
156. Id. at 1701
157. Id. at 2800.
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equal degree" ;:15 "at" as "indicating a relation of source, cause or oc-
casion," "indicating point or position in a series or scale," and "indi-
cating position in time" ;159 and "after" as "later in time than; subse-
quent to and in consequence of." 160
With the foregoing variations attributed to the terms under con-
sideration, that a court should not attempt to state absolutely the
effect of such words unless the intention of the parties in employing
the particular term is patently clear seems obvious.'". Actually, the
New York courts have recognized this, 6 2 but in view of the Amies
opinion, have not felt such to be applicable where terms of the nature
of those contained in the introductory clause of this section have been
employed. At the same time, the New Jersey courts have similarly felt
that such terms were to be given effect as a "time" clause "as a matter
of law."1 63 On the other hand, many courts, though professing to fol-
low the New York methodology, have felt that such payment terms
require submission to the jury and are not for the court even after
parol evidence of the surrounding circumstances has been given.
Perhaps the most thorough analysis to be found in the decisions fol-
lowing the Amies rationale is that of Hamricek v. Cooper River Lum-
ber Co.164 That case is atypical of opinions adhering to the "condition
precedent" rationale in that it analyzes the factual situation carefully
and refers to cases which had adopted each of the pertinent ration-
ales.16 5 But in its "clinching" argument that case reverted to the
reason most often found behind "condition" decisions, viz.,
[lf the [payment clause] ... be regarded as ambiguous, any
doubt as to its meaning must be resolved against [the broker] ...
who prepared the contract and submitted it to the seller and
purchaser.166
And the last phrase of the foregoing quotation refers to yet another
factor relied on which has often served to convince other courts as
well that a "condition" was intended by the parties. Reference is of
course made to the fact that the "payment" provision was contained
in the contract of sale between the seller and purchaser, rather than
having existence in a separate, previously expressed provision. With
this present the court felt that the parties
158. Id. at 158-59.
159. Id. at 172.
160. Id. at 45.
161. See note 152 supra.
162. See note 82 supra.
163. See note 11 supra. In so doing the court is using the phrase "matter of
law" to indicate that the interpretation is for the court, not the jury. Notwith-
standing the language used, however, such interpretation is a "question of fact."
See 3 CoRBI, CONTRACTS § 554 (1951).
164. 223 S.C. 119, 74 S.E.2d 575 (1953).
165. The discussion of New Jersey cases, however, leaves much to be desired.Compare that discussion with the discussion in § II supra.
166. 223 S.C. at 126, 74 S.E.2d at 578 (1953).
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clearly did not contemplate that (execution of the contraet of sale
would give rise to] , .. an absolute obligation on the part of the
seller to pay a commission ... irrespective of whether the sale
was ever consummated,
We saw earlier that the same factor has been considered determina-
ti ve by the New Jersey courts in the absence of a statement which the
court will treat as an aclknowledgment that the conmission was
owing.-', There was no e pression of such an "ae-kowtdmment' in
the Hauticf case. And, since the broker there was a mere volunteer,
imposition of a "condition" would be supported by consideration.lt
Thus, the decision would appear sound whichever view one might take
of the semantics involved.
Each of the bases for a "condition" decision presented above has,
singly or in combination, served as the foundation for "condition"
decisions by other courts.S0 Of more importance to our discussion
than isolated decisions interpreting "payment" clauses as providing a
"condition precedent," however, are opinions to be found in jurisdic-
tions such as California and Massachusetts where the courts have
accepted both that and the "time" rationale, which one being con-
sidered as appropriate for the particular case under consideration
depewding upon the particular circumstances surrounding the trans-
action. The California decisions clearly demonstrate the importance
stch courts attribute to the varying shades of circumstances surromd-
in-- a commission agreement. For example, in Peak- v. Jfurgensm  a
broker, without previous employment, presented a purchase offer to a
proprr i y owner. The owner accepted the offer, but only after adding
to the agreement a promise "to pay commission upon consummation
M7. frl',.
l;8. See especially text supported by notes 31-37 supra.
1;G See text supported by note 149 .,wpra.
170. PerhIN-ps tthe myozA MXir-,g ateptvnze vf the Williston, and A%-4tm interpo-
tat ir,, i z; t be found in Jones v. Palace Realty Co., 226 N.C. 303, 37 S.E. 2d 9061 ,W?) where the court discussed the meaning of the tern "when" and the phrase
"as 3,on as," coming to the "condition" conclusion in part by reliance on AmI.
Thc bw,-. case, however, involved a listing that provided for payment to be made
""Lit of the sale price." See text supported by notes 215-61 infta.
Other cases not involving "acknowledgment" (see text supported by notes
197-2.... vfea) which have adhered to the "condition" rationale include: Loat v.
Outhwaife, 10 T.L.R. 76 (C.A. 1893); Hodges v. Lewis, 112 Cal. App. 2d 526, 246
1 1d *;7; (1952); Blount v. Freeman, 94 Ga. App. 110, 93 S.E.2d MO (1956);
K kr Real Estate Co. v. Shippen Hardwood Lumber Co., 34 Ga. App. 08, 129
S E. 29f (1925); Tarbell v. Bomes, 48 R.I. 86, 135 Atl. 604 (1927); Smith v.
But fri, 4 Utah 2d 61 286 P.2d 806 (1955) ; of. Willard v. Preston, 92 F.2d 851
(S1h Or. 1937); Kedick v. Speck, 67 F.2d 295, 296 (4th Cir. 1938) (dissenting
eypinm,); Ballard v. Shea, 121 II. App. 135 (1905); Gaut v. Dunlap, 188 S.W.
Io2 (Te:.. Civ. App. 1916).
17IL. 5 Cal. App. 2d 573, 4*3 F.2d 569 (1935). See also Hodges v. Lewis supra
Vii 1-1C (I, 0NIZINYan v. rt 27i2 P 24 'qQ4 M41l. M4)'WWI ~i =Qkve Mn
arh I~:v~k ene~t that the iealtor had acted as a broker. Although it was ex-
pI .ssh stated that the purpose of the agreement was "to establish the terms of
palypu',+I of the comnission for such services," the court felt that the outside
evut ~nmed constituted a 'condition precedent" to payment,
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of the sale." Here there was, as in Hamrick and some of the New
Jersey decisions, no valid ground on which to find that a commission
had been earned, and the court accordingly found "consummation" to
be a "condition precedent." But, in Hiss v. Sutton' 72 where the pay-
ment provision preceded action on the part of the broker, the court,
in finding that a promise to pay "in the event of the exercise of this
option.., to be paid through and at the close of escrow" did not pro-
vide a "condition precedent," said,
The fact that... it was provided that the plaintiff's commission
was to be paid "through and at the close of escrow" is not to be
interpreted to mean that the plaintiff was to be entitled to no com-
mission unless the agreement for the sale of the property was
fully executed through the medium of such escrow, but only that
if such escrow was completed plaintiff was to receive his commis-
sion through and at the time of such completion .... 173
Thus, the California court clearly adopted the "time" rationale, break-
ing the brokerage agreement into (1) the undertaking (to secure
exercise of the option) and (2) the payment clause ("through and at
the close of escrow"). And the California court has likewise found
that a promise to pay "when the transaction is consummated," found
in a listing agreement executed before the broker had undertaken any
services, provides only for the "time" of payment, again dividing the
agreement into two parts, undertaking and payment. 17"1 These de-
cisions gave the "time" interpretation its proper significance.' But,
in other decisions, the California court has used the term in the sense
in which it has been employed by the New York court.176
172. 203 Cal. 459, 264 Pac. 748 (1928).
173. Id. at 461, 264 Pac. at 749.
174. Wallace v. Zinman, 200 Cal. 585, 254 Pac. 946 (1927) relying on the oft-
cited opinion in Purcell v. Firth, 175 Cal. 746, 167 Pac. 379 (1917).
A similar approach was presented by the opinion in Knisely v. Leathe, 178
S.W. 453 (Mo. 1915), reaffirming 256 Mo. 341, 166 S.W. 257 (1914). In the
former opinion the court emphasized that the broker's "undertaking" was to
secure a "sale"; therefore, a provision for payment of commission "out of the
purchase price" merely served to provide a time at which payment would be
made. Thus, although the "fund" from which payment was to be made was not
realized, the broker was entitled to payment. Compare section 3 infra. See also
Harvey v. Francisco, 35 S.W.2d 366 (Mo. App. 1931). The opinions in both cases,
however, must be considered in light of the fact that each involved "fault" on
the part of the listing owner. See Caneer v. Martin, 238 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1951) where the court expressly stated that each ground supported a decision
in favor of the broker.
Care must be used in bisecting a commission agreement, however. It may be
that the "payment" clause cannot properly be excised from the undertaking.
See, e.g., Leventritt v. Cowell, 21 Cal. App. 597, 132 Pac. 627 (1913).
175. See text at p. 298, and text supported by notes 82-85 supra.
176. Vatcher v. Grier, 50 Cal. App. 39, 195 Pac. 75 (1920), aff'd, 50 Cal. App.
42, 195 Pac. 76 (1921). See text supported by notes 82-85 supra. See also note
150 supra and text supported thereby. Cf. Althouse v. Watson, 143 Md. 650, 123
Atl. 47 (1923) where the commission agreement expressly acknowledged that a
commission was owing and also provided that, for the purpose of "providing for
the time of payment," commission payments would be made "as the payments of
the purchase price are received"; Johnston v. Downey, 257 S.W. 504 (Mo. App.
1924). See text supported by notes 215-61 infra.
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The Massachusetts cases clearly present the consideration such
courts attach to an "acknowledgment" when the agreement to pay
commission does not precede the rendering of the required services.1
Two decisions would appear to shed the most light on the Massachu-
setts approach. In Alvord v. Cook,x7s involving an exchange agree-
ment executed by a broker pursuant to an earlier listing, one of the
exchanging landowners agreed, in an instrument separate from the
contract of exchange, to pay the broker a commission "at the time
'the [agreement of exchange] ... is carried into effect.' ',79 The court
flt that such language was susceptible of either a "time" or a "con-
dition" interpretation in the absence of the aid of parol testimony
concerning the surrounding circumstances, and accordingly upheld
the admission of such parol testimony. But, with such admission, the
court felt that the "only reasonable" interpretation lay in a 'time"
construction. Why? Because the broker had done all he was employed
to do, completion of the exchange rested solely within the power of the
property owner, and
It is not reasonable to suppose that the plaintiffs [broker-] in-
tended to leave the question of the payment of their commission
in a matter where they had preformed their whole duty ... to the
chance of a subsequent cancellation of the [contract of exchange]
* * ., or to the whim or caprice of either of the principals.se
(Emphasis added to indicate language suggesting that the court
was not merely concerned with the problem of the promisor's de-
fault, although such admittedly was an important factor in thedeeislon.) -:
And, in Canton v. Tliowas, 2 the court, confronted by a provision
by which the property, owner agreed to pay a commission to the
broker foe putting through the sale "when papers are passed,","
seized upon the "recognition" of the owner that the broker had per-
formed the required act of acceptance and concluded that the payment
clause served only to designate the "time" at which payment would be
made.,' In so doing, however, the court felt that such an interpreta-
377. Compare the New Jersey handling at text supported by notes 26-27 supra.
178, 174 Mass. 120, 54 N.E. 499 (1899).
179. Id. at 121, 54 N.E. at 500. Is it significant that the opinion refers to pay-
ment to be made at the "time" when the exchange agreement is carried out
whereas the actual payment clause, as quoted in the official report (174 Mass. at
121) bit not to be found in the unofficial, provided for payment at the "date"
when such agreement was carried out?
IS(). Id. at 125.
181. IbMl. Another Massachusetts decision clearly enunciated the "time' ra-
tionale as a result of the broker having earned his commission upon securing a
putchaser ready, willinz, and able. It was clearly held that a clause in the con-
tract of sale providing for payment "when title is passed" provided only the time
of payment. Rosenthal v. Schwartz, 214 Mass. 371, 101 N.E. 1070 (1913). See
also Caneer v. Martin, 238 S.W.2d $21 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
182. 264 Mass. 457, 162 N.E. 769 (1928).
183. Id. at 458, 162 N.E. 769.
184. Compare the importance attached to this by the New Jersey courts. See
especially text, supported by notes 15-16 & 32-33 supra.
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tion probably did violence to the owner's intention, but felt bound by
the Alvord decision, saying that if the owner wanted to make the
event stated in such a clause a "condition precedent" he should have
used the phrase "if and when."'185
Thus, comparing the Hamrick (South Carolina) case with Alvord,
we find both courts involved with a commission agreement executed
at the same time that the property owner and proposed purchaser
entered into a contract-in Hcamrick the provision was part of the
contract of exchange itself; in Alvord it was a separate instrument
executed substantially simultaneously. There are decisions which in-
dicate that such a distinction could be crucial. Typical of these is the
California decision in Sanstrum v. Gonser 16 where the court found
that a brokerage provision finding expression only in the contract of
sale between the seller and purchaser had no "life" distinct from that
contract; therefore, if the contract fails, the brokerage agreement
fails with it. Thus, fulfillment of the sale contract becomes a condition
to payment.187 This would not necessarily be true where the broker-
age agreement is found in a separate instrument, even though for
interpretation purposes the two would be considered as one. 88 But
even in the case where the commission clause is to be found only in
the contract between seller and buyer, as was true in Hamrick, if the
court can find an acknowledgment that the broker has earned a com-
mission it would seem that casualty to the seller-buyer contract should
be immaterial insofar as obligation to pay commission is concerned,
although such cont-act might well be considered as stating a "time"
when actual payment is to be made. In this connection it is also im-
portant to note that the California Statute of Frauds requires that
employment of brokers for the purchase or sale of real estate be com-
mitted to writing.189 In Sanstrum the first memorandum sufficient to
satisfy this requirement was found in the escrow instructions; there-
fore, there would be consideration for the statement of a "condition"
at that juncture. It is further important to note that the court, in an
earlier part of the opinion, had specifically referred to "acknowledg-
ment," by implication, at least, suggesting that "acknowledgment"
185. 264 Mass. 457, 458, 162 N.E. 769 (1928). While use of such terms as
those suggested has alnost uniformly led to a "condition" interpretation, in most
cases where there is an "acknowledgement" that the broker has performed the
required services the problem of consideration for such an agreement should be-
come of primary importance.
186. 295 P.2d 532, 537 (Cal. App. 1956), quoting from Lawrence Block Co. v.
Palston, 123 Cal. App. 2d 300, 266 P.2d 856 (1954). See also Mitchell v. Johnston,
298 P.2d 170 (Cal. Super. 1956).
187. Compare note 148 supra and text supported thereby. Cf. Stanton v.
Carnahan, 15 Cal. App. 527, 115 Pac. 339 (1911) (brokerage provision finding
expression only in contract of sale is for broker's benefit and may be enforced
by him at any time before the parties thereto rescind such contract).
188. See note 141 supra.
189. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1624(5) (Diering 1949).
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s euid result in a diferunt decision when it said, quoting from Har-
ff I r I ',,, (. . M o tfj',, .
This instruction [in the escrow] was quite different from an un-
conditional acknowledgment of the alleged debt; it rested upon a
condition .... 10,
Few courts have relied on the Sanst um rationale first stated above.
If such non-acceptance be accepted as a proper attitude, and I submit
that it is, we find the Hanz rick court feeling that it would be unrea-
sonable to suppose that the parties felt that payment of the commis-
sion had become an absolute obligation of the owner by execution of
the contract of which the payment provision was a part, whereas the
A (ri 'od court felt that the broker had done all he could do by securing
execution of the contract of exchange and it would be unreasonable
to suppose that he had intended to leave payment to the chance that
the contract would not be completed. While "acknowledgment" or
lack thereof finds no mention in either decision, it seems evident that
such played a prominent part in each opinion, the major distinguish-
ing feature being the eagerness or reluctance, propriety or impro-
priety, of the particular court to find that such existed in the absence
of an express statement to that effect. It would seem that Canton
expressed this conclusion for the Massachusetts court. On the other
hand, the broker in the Hamrick case was a mere volunteer-there
had been no prior employment-and as such could not have "earned"
a commission. Should the South Carolina court be confronted with
a situation where a commission could be acknowledged as "earned,"
would it find it "unreasonable" that the parties intended to impose an
obligation on the property owner? And, even if it were to find that
the agreement was ambiguous and so a proper place for receiving
parol testimony to resolve the ambiguity, as had been done in Alvord,
would it, contrary to that decision, have submitted the question to
the jury?'-
We have thus seen the importance most courts attach to an ac-
knowledgment that commission has been earned. While parol evi-
dence may be admissable to help resolve the "question of fact" whether
a particular listing provides a "condition precedent" or "time" of pay-
ment, a discriminating court will hold to a "time" interpretation
190. 56 Cal. App. 498, 502, 205 Pac. 890, 892 (1922).
191. 2V5 P.Zd 532 at 536.
192. See text sup orted by notes 168-69 szpra. And see Amiss w. Wesnofske
whe,e there was acknowledgment that services had been performed pursuant to
a p" kor employment--court looked to the terms of the Prior employment "as a
matter #f law." Adi see Langford v. King Lumber & Mfg. Co., 128 Fla. 855, 167
So, 817 (1935) where the commission agreement provided 'we hereby aaowtei
that there fs a balance due , . as commission" et the cour, a proved our
missiop to the Jury and upheld its verdict that the payment prolviNInfollowing
constituted a condhion precedent. Cf Ballap v, Lake Weir Light & Water Co.,
I Fla, 918, 130 So, 421 (1930).
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where such is present. And the holding of the Massachusetts court
in Lord v. Williams' 9 must be considered as a clear expression that
such does not foreclose a "condition" interpretation in similar cases
where such an acknowledgment is missing. This results from the
statement that the phrase "on passing of title" did not "as a matter
of law" import either a "condition precedent" or a "time" of payment
and from approval of submission of the meaning of such phrase to
the jury. 94 The Lord case involved a situation where a broker with
whom the property had been listed had secured a purchaser and had
reduced the negotiations between the listing owner and proposed pur-
chaser to a writing which included a provision that commission was
to be paid "on passing title." Thus, it would have been just as legiti-
mate for the court to have considered the broker as having earned his
commission as it was in the Alvord case. It would also have been an
opportunity for expression of a rationale similar to Sanstrum. Yet
the court, stating that interpretation of the payment provision was a
"question of fact," upheld the trial court's submission to the jury.
But, notwithstanding the approving language, would the trial court
have been upheld had the jury returned a "condition" verdict?"'5 An
affirmative answer is suggested by Clark v. Hovey,0 " but it is sub-
mitted that this suggestion would not now be followed. This conclu-
sion rests on the fact that the Clark opinion was distinguished by
Canton as resting on "ameliorating circumstances." Just what these
were is not immediately apparent, and it would appear that the
phrase served more as a "make-weight" to obviate an overruling than
as an indication that Clark would be authoritative in some future
controversy.1 97
Putting aside the "assumption" with which this division of the
discussion began,198 where a brokerage agreement employing a "pay-
ment" term found in the introduction to this section presents neither
an express "acknowledgment" nor circumstances in which an "eager"
court will, or properly may, find such, 99 is the interpretation of the
instrument for court or jury? The Lord case said "jury," although
193. 259 Mass. 278, 156 N.E. 421 (1927).
194. It is obvious that the court was employing the phrase "matter of law"
to indicate that the issue was for the court rather than the jury. See note 163
supra. And see notes 198-206 infra and text supported thereby.
195. In Langford v. King Lumber & Mfg. Co., 123 Fla. 855, 167 So. 817 (1935)
the Florida court provided an affirmative answer upholding a "condition" verdict
notwithstanding an express acknowledgment that a commission was due.
196. 217 Mass. 485, 105 N.E. 222 (1914).
197. The Clark case also raises the problem of "acknowledgment" in that the
broker, employed to sell, had secured the execution of a contract between the
seller and purchaser and simultaneously had executed a brokerage agreement
with the seller by which payment was to be made from a "fund" still to come into
existence. See text supported by notes 215-61 infra.
198. See text following note 152 supra.
199. For example, where the payment provision finds expression in an original
employment which precedes the rendering of services.
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its authority is questionable. Hiss v. Suttoe holding to the "time"
rationale, and Hamrick, v. Cooper River Lumber Co.20 and Amies V.
W('sflofske " adhering to the "condition" rationale, considered this
as a matter for the court. Other courts have disagreed in some re-
spects. For example, in Hall v. Sheraton HotelP13 the Pennsylvania
court reversed a "condition" holding and remanded the case for a
new trial and a jury determination as to whether "at the time [later
changed to 'date'] of settlement" constituted a condition precedent
or a mere time of payment.: °' One must carefully consider the exact
words employed, however, for in cases involving slightly different
terminology these courts may feel that interpretation is for the court.
Thus, in a case involving personal property, a lower Pennsylvania
court held that a trial court had erred in submitting to the jury the
meaning of a commission agreement providing for payment "as soon
as" a particular fund came into existence.205 Similarly, where the
commission has been earned before expression of an outside event at
the occurrence of which payment is to be made, such courts treat the
provision as one providing only for the "time" of payment.-B
2. Commission shall be iue and payable when (etc.) ...
The decided cases offer little help in setting such phraseology off
as a distinctive category. This follows from the fact that the cases
involving commission agreements employing such language have, with
but one exception,; °7 found the agreement expressed as part of the
contract executed by seller and purchaser or as a part of the sur-
roundings of such a contract,-°  and from the fact that no "aclnowl-
edfgment" is present. In such a circumstance it seems obvious that
an agreement that no commission would be due or payable would be
00. See note 172 siifp, and text supnorted thereby. And see cases cited in
note 174 -,1pro; Miller v. Moylan, 72 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1954); of. Nunn v. Barber,
207 Olda. 393, 249 P.2d 999 (1952); Kauffman v. Marlborough Inv. Co., 154
Wash, :,!)(;, 282 Pac. 377 (1929).
201. See note 164 sapra and text supported thereby.
202. See note 74 spra and text supported thereby.
203. 172 Pa. 563, 94 A.2d 363 (195j)
204. in its opinion the present court explained the earlier opinion in Simon
v. MINye , 284 Pa. 3, 130 Ati. 256 (1925), inferentially explained the opinion in
Alioiosa v. Oveliman, 89 Pa. Super. 377 (1926), which had relied on Sinox as
well, sayig that the Sbooui holding was that "Under the circumstances [there]
appearmno, the words 'at settlement' [were] . . .ambiguouas and, therefore, open
to explanation."
20.5, J. H. Hillman & Co. v. Joseph Joseph & Bros., 9 Pa. Super. 1 (1898).
Cf. Matuszewski v. Grisius, 118 Pa. Super. 196, 180 Atl. 130 (1935); Baum v.
Gollblaft, 81 Pa. Super. 233 (1923).
204. Clark v. Battaglia, 47 Pa. Super. 290 (1911). Compare the importance
ascibed to an "acknowledgment."
2 t7. Prideaux v. Phymouth Securities Co., 291 Mo. App. 1060, 84 S.W.2d 166
1U 9:5), The listing in-olved in this case, however, provided that the commission
"shall be due and payable only [from a named fund]." (Emphasis added.)
208. For example, in Coulter N. Howard, 203 Cal. 17, 262 Pac. 761 (1927) the
commission provision found its first effective expression in the escrow instructions.
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accorded no less effect than one providing merely that no commission
would be "payable"-that is, the named outside event will be inter-
preted as providing a "condition precedent" to earning of the com-
mission. Such has been the decision in all but one case, Lattimore v.
George J. Mellina & Co. 20 9 There the Texas Court of Civil Appeals
accepted a clause providing that commission "shall be due and payable
when this sale has been completed," finding expression only in the
contract of sale, as the controlling language, and held that such a pro-
vision stipulated only the "time" of payment. In so doing the court
placed great reliance on language in the opinion in Lippincott v. Con-
tent.210 Such reliance was misplaced, however. While the Lippincott
decision dealt with "due and payable" language coupled with a "con-
summation" clause, the language seized upon was merely introductory
dictum to the holding that a "condition precedent" had been stated.
Such holding illustrates that the New Jersey court itself has not fol-
lowed its "when payable" rationale in ",due and payable" cases.21 1 The
Texas court indirectly recognized this when it proceeded to ignore
the "due and" addition and affixed its attention solely on the term
"payable." But it would seem that, in the absence of an "acknowl-
edgment," if the provision is entitled to any jural effect,21 2 nothing
would be due until the stated event had occurred.213 The term "due"
would seem to give a "condition" rationale in this type of case a
much more satisfactory basis than is present in a situation of the
Hamrick type.
One analogous case has dealt with a commission clause executed
prior to the rendering'of services. In Calkins v. Alley 21 4 the broker-
age agreement provided that commission would become "due when
209. 195 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
210. 123 N.J.L. 277, 8 A.2d 362 (Ct. Err. & App. 1939).
211. See text supported by notes 31-37, 41-44 supra.
212. See text supported by notes 177-85 supra.
213. But of. Gaut v. Dunlap, 188 S.W. 1020 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) ("when
this deal is closed the first party will owe [the broker] . . . commission'" held,
upon evidence showing that the parties treated the employment as requiring more
than a sale, to require that the "deal" [an exchange] be effected or excused
because of the listing owner's fault).
And in Rabinowitz v. North Texas Realty Co., 270 S.W. 579 (Tex. Civ. App.
1925) where the commission provision found expression in an instrument executed
simultaneously with execution of a contract of exchange between the listing owner
and the broker's client, the court may have implied that a broker could be "en-
titled" to a commission but its actual payment be conditioned. Compare the New
York position stated at text supported by note 83 supra. It would seem, however,
that a more logical construction of this decision lies in a finding that although
the specified event had not actually occurred the broker could recover when it
became clear that it would not occur. This would eliminate any need to determine
whether the commission provision constituted a "condition." This suggested con-
struction is not meant to slight the fact that the opinion used language indicating
that the decisional court thought it was dealing with a "condition" which had been
excused by the fault of the owner. But see Frischkorn Real Estate Co. v. Hinck-
ley, 227 Mich. 399, 198 N.W. 882 (1924) (semble).
214. 190 Iowa 1180, 181 N.W. 427 (1921). Cf. Tilton v. Gates Land Co., 140
Wis. 197, 121 N.W. 331 (1909).
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deals are closed." The "time" rationale was expressly urged by the
broker, but the court found that no commission was earned until the
deal was finally closed. On the rationale urged as applicable where
the provision is "due and payable," it seems that nothing would be
due until the outside event had occurred, and that a "condition" would
be the only proper interpretation in such a case. And this the court
determined.
. Commission shall be paid from a "fund" still to come into exis-
tence.
Typical of payment provisions creating a fund from which com-
mission payment will be made are those in which the commission is
to be paid "out of the purchase price" or an installment thereof, or
when a specific payment is made. Mlust such a "fund" come into
existence before a broker is entitled to his commission? For example,
where a broker is employed to negotiate the sale of certain property,
but his commission is to be paid out of the purchase price, will a
binding- contract of sale"- between the listing owner and a purchaser
secured by the broker alone entitle the broker to his commission, or
must the designated "fund" also come into existence precedent to
fruition of such a claim? Mlost courts have simply found, as a matter
for the court, '  that designation of such a "fund" created a "condi-
tio- pt'ecedent."''71 This result is usually reached without reference
15. See note 38 ..rp-T.
2116. Co00,ta, Kirchoff v. Cummard, 26 Ariz. 512, 226 Pac. 1092 (1924) ("pro-
vi, ,, said payment be made" considered as rendering the listing ambiguous;
pa, ol 1--Jdence admitted to resolve such ambiguity held to show an "acknowledg-
m,.nt" 1hat commission was owing and was not restricted to the named "fund";
Fiwar+d v. Baker, 39 Cal. App. 755, 180 Pac. 33 (1919), cited at note 217 infra,
ex iessly distinguished as involving an unequivocal statement of a condition).
217. Fletcher v. Campbell, 15 D.L.R. 420 (Ont. Sup. Ct. 1913); Malone v.
Dfl0artl, 212 Ala. 361, 102 So. 705 (1925); Roach v. McDonald, 187 Ala. 64, 65
So. 8231 (1914); Coulter" v. Howard, 203 Cal. 17, 262 Pac. 751 (1927); Lindley
v. Fa,, 119 Cal. 239, 51 Pac. 333 (1897); McPhail v. Buell, 87 Cal. 115, 25 Pac.
20;; (1811)0); SnelI v. W'ickersham, 295 P.2d 918 (Cal. App. 1956); Eddy v. Hick-
mani. 1:1; Cal. App. 103, 28 P.2d '36 (1933); Mitchell v. Green, 110 Cal. App. 259,
29:: Pac. 879 (1930); House v. Cook, 91 Cal. App. 617, 267 Pac. 354 (1928);
Cannon v. Selmser, 85 Cal. App. 783, 230 Pac. 332 (1927) (express rejection of
tlh. "tiwc," rationale); Miller v. Lerdo Land Co., 52 Cal. App. 662, 199 Pac. 1073( 1921) ; Vatcher v. Grier, 50 Cal. App. 39, 195 Pac. 75 (1921) (express rejection
f thOe "time" rationale); Edwards v. Baker, 39 Cal. App. 755, 180 Pac. 33
I 1 ) ; Prince v. Selby Smelting & Lead Co., 35 Cal. App. 684, 170 Pac. 1075
(W117); Beckwitb-Andirson Land Co. v. Allison, 26 Cal. App. 473, 147 Pac. 482
1915); Norris v. Walsh, 71 Colo. 185, 205 Pac. 276 (1922); Seminole Fruit &
Land Co. v. Rosborough-Weiner, Inc., 43 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 1950); Langford v.
Kin, Lumber & Mfg. Co., 12'.3 Fla. 855, 167 So. 817 (1935), reaffirmed, 132 Fla.
14:;, 181 So. 395 (1938); Cherry v. Joyce, 168 Kan. 475, 213 P.2d 1010 (1950);
Odem Realty Co. v. Dyer, 242 Ky. 58, 45 S.W.2d 838 (1932); Clark v. Hovey,
217 Mass. 485, 105 N.E. 222 (1914) (Could the existence of the "fund" have been
the "amwliorating circumstances" on which this case was later distinguished? See
text supported by note 197 mtipra.); Van Dyke & Co. v. Stuart Land Co., 245
Mich. I 1, 222 N.W. 98 (1928) ; Colvin v. Post Mortgage and Land Co., 225 N.Y.
-0i0, 122 N.E. 454 (1919); Larson v. Burroughs, 131 App. Div. 877, 116 N.Y.
Supp. :358 (2d Dep't 1909) ; Nekarda v. Presberger, 123 App. Div. 418, 107 N.Y.
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by the court to the instrument in which the provision was found, or
to the time in the transaction chronology at which it was expressed,
or to whether realization of the fund was part of the "undertaking"
or created a "condition precedent" to payment. Each of these con-
siderations would seem appropriate, but it would appear that the
courts were concerned only with the latter and were satisfied that the
"fund" provision was part of the broker's undertaking.2 18 Other
courts, however, have demonstrated a less positive approach and, in
some instances, 219 have found that such a provision did not state a
"condition precedent." For example, in C. H. Graves & Co. v. Coo 2 10
Supp. 897 (1st Dep't 1908); Van Varick v. Suburban Inv. Co., 76 Misc. 593, 135
N.Y. Supp. 299 (1912); McComas v. Smith, 151 Okla. 193, 3 P.2d 213 (1931);
Becker v. Oregon-Kansas Timber Co., 99 Ore. 602, 195 Pac. 1038 (1921); Co-
lumbia Realty Inv. Co. v. Alameda Land Co., 87 Ore. 277, 168 Pac. 64 (1917);
Matuszewski v. Grisius, 118 Pa. Super. 196, 180 Atl. 130 (1935); Lowenstein v.
MePeak, 48 Pa. Super. 280 (1911); Rhodes & Son v. Hutcheson, 284 S.W. 226
(Tex. Civ. App. 1926); Laird v. Elliott, 219 S.W. 499 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920);
Burnett v. Edling, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 711, 48 S.W. 775 (1898) ; Watson v. Odelf,
58 Utah 276, 198 Pac. 772 (1921); Murray v. Rickard, 103 Va. 132, 48 S.E. 870
(1904); Dallas Dome Wyoming Oil Fields Co. v. Brooder, 55 Wyo. 109, 97
P.2d 311 (1939); Heath v. Huffhines, 152 S.W. 176 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) (dic-
tum); cf. Waters v. Carelton, 4 Port. 205 (Ala. 1836); Lind v. Huene, 271 Pac.
1087 (Cal. 1928); Frank v. Bonnevie, 20 Colo. App. 164, 77 Pac, 363 (1904);
Ballas v. Lake Weir Light & Water Co., 100 Fla. 913, 130 So. 421 (1930) (Al-
though the case was decided on the pleadings, the court enunciated the conclusion
that provision for payment from the purchase price created a condition requiring
receipt of the purchase money, notwithstanding the existence of an Introductory
clause acknowledging that the broker had "effected a sale." Compare text sup-
ported by note 83 supr&; conclusion at text supported by notes 293-94 infra.)
Forbes v. Gordon & Gerber, 298 Mass. 91, 9 N.E.2d 416 (1937); Staples v.
O'Reilly, 288 S.W.2d 670 (Mo. App. 1956); Gilder v. Davis, 137 N.Y. 504, 33
N.E. 600 (1893); Taylor v. Crucible Steel Co., 192 App. Div. 445, 183 N.Y. Supp.
181 (1st Dep't 1920), af'd, 232 N.Y. 583, 134 N.E. 581 (1922). But of. Althouse
v. Watson, 143 Md. 650, 123 AtI. 47 (1923) (semble).
Many of the foregoing cases also involve language such as "in the event,"
"only," and "provided," which has been nearly universally considered as provid-
In a condition. See text supported by notes 47-56 and 94-97 
supra, and 262-68
n'rn Others, although not involving an express statement of such terms, have
foun the court using such as descriptive of the effect of employment of a 'fund"
clause. See, e.g., Lind v. Huene, 271 Pac. 1087 (Cal. 1928). Care should be taken
in each instance to ascertain whether such language refers to the undertaking
or merely to the commission clause. However, because the opinions usually
neither separate the clauses in this fashion, nor single out such language when
considering the brokerage provision as a whole, no attempt has been made to
do so here. But see subdivision 4 infra. The existence of such language, however,
may be crucial. See note 216 supra.
An analogous situation in which the same result is reached is presented whero
the commission amount is to be determined by the amount received by the oner.
See especially Lee v. Greenwood Agency Co., 123 Miss. 823, 86 So. 449 (1920),
rev'd in part, 125 Miss. 177, 87 So. 485 (1921). Cf. Sanstrum v. Gonser, 295 P.2d
532 (al. App. 1956); Goldston Brothers Inc. v. Newkirk, 233 N. C. 428, 64S.E.2d424 (1951).-218. Of course, the mere fact that the contract of sale secured by the broker
provides for deferred payments of the purchase price does not affect the broker's
commission clause based on securing a "sale." For the commission to be made
dependent upon existence of a "fund," express words must be used. Rice-Wray v.
Palma, 216 Mich. 324, 185 N.W. 841 (1921).
219. The Minnesota court has expressly recognized that a condition may be
provided. See text supported by note 243 infra.
220. 115 Minn. 34, 131 N.W. 854 (1911).
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the court provided the rationale that such a payment provision had
been inserted in the brokerage agreement for the sole purpose of pro-
tecting the owner in himself making a sale at the same time that the
broker, unknown to the owner, was likewise making one,221 and did
not affect the undertaking. The owner had raised the argument that
the payment provision signified that commission was to be paid only
on a "completed" sale, the court expressly rejecting such contention.222
It is difficult to characterize the court's reasoning, however, for the
arbitrary refusal of the owner to accept the purchaser procured by
the broker looms as a critical factor. 2 ; Nevertheless it was stated
that "the clear purpose of the contract is to obtain the services of the
plaintiff to negotiate a sale of defendant's property" 22, and "the con-
tract suggests no requirements as to or qualifications of the purchaser
except that he be ready to pay the specified price."22
Courts accepting the Graives rationale, as well as the Minnesota
court itselfL-" have not used it exclusively. Perhaps most expressive
of this flexible method of handling the problem are the Arkansas de-
cisions. In Rj.qgs v. Brock, where it was provided in the contract
of sale that the commission would be paid "upon the payment of the
residue purchase price," that court held that until the residue was
paid there was nothing available to the broker-until such time as it
was paid he had "failed to produce a purchaser who was ready, able
and willing to purchase under the terms of the contract. 22 And the
same result obtained where the owner accepted a proposed pur-
chaser's counter-offer only after the broker agreed that a commission
was to be paid when certain purchase money notes were paid.2 9
Similarly, in Boysea o. Frink- - the court treated as stating a "con-
dition" a provision, contained in a listing agreement executed before
rendition of services, that commission for making a sale was to be
paid "one-half when one-third of purchase price has been paid, the
other one-half of the commission whenever one-half of the purchase
price has been paid." The property owner and purchaser had sub-
sequently entered a binding contract of sale. As a result, the broker
221. A somewhat weak reason, for, in the absence of an express statement
tewsa listinc owner remains free to make a sale himself. See Wallace,
Pro,>(,'rq L~ability Under Real Estate Brokerage Contracts, 37 IOWA L. Rsv.
350 (19,52).
222. The owner's contention had been accepted by the trial court. C. H. Graves
& Co, v. Cook, 115 Minn. 34, 35, 131 N.W. 854 (1911).
22'. Compare the New York situation discussed at text supported by notes
127, 136-:37 supra.
224. 115 Minn. at 35, 131 N.W. at 854.
2 2 . IhT
220. See text supported by notes 242-43 inf!ra.
227. 208 Ark. 1050, 189 S.W.2d 367 (1945).
228. Id. at 1055, 189 S.W.2d at 370.
22,1. Trimue v. McCaleb, 172 Ark. 137, 287 S.W. 740 (1926).
2;J0. 8O Ark. 254, 96 S.W. 1056 (1906).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
would, in the absence of an express provision releasing the owner
from the effect of such a rule, be entitled to his commission for having
made a "sale" of the listed property.231 Inasmuch as the court held
that the payment provision placed the risk of the purchaser's financial
responsibility on the broker, and remanded the case for failure to give
an instruction having such as its effect, the ultimate effect of the
Boysen decision was to treat the payment provision as the statement
of a "condition." In Beard v. Read,232 however, the Arkansas court
expressly held, in the face of a vigorous dissent,23 3 that, where the
listing owner's offer provided that the broker was "to make sale," a
payment provision providing for commission to be paid "from the
proceeds arising from such sale" neither added to the undertaking
nor conditioned payment. This conclusion rested on a determination
that the owner's brokerage offer was "nothing more nor less than a
contract (sic) by which the [broker] . . .agreed to furnish a 1ur-
chaser, ready, willing and able.1234 And, in Moore 'v. Irvi. as the court
treated a listing agreement providing for brokerage payment "'in
consideration of [the broker's] ... services in making a sale or trans-
fer' to be paid 'out of the first money collected,'" as requiring only
the securing of a contract of sale. Thus, the Arkansas court has uti-
lized the same methodology in "fund" decisions as the California
court has enunciated in "when payable" decisions.23
Cases from still other jurisdictions evidence a failure to compre-
hend fully the subtle ramifications present in cases involving similar,
yet distinct, listing language. For example, in Thompson v. RyVan 37
where the property owner agreed, in a listing agreement executed
during the course of the broker's negotiations with a proposed pur-
chaser, to pay the broker a commission "if the deal or trade is made,"
the Iowa court felt that a further provision that the broker was to
"accept securities for same" in itself showed that the parties con-
templated a "fund" which must come into existence if a commission
was to be paid. In reaching its decision the court properly relied on
an alternative holding in Robertson v. Vase y,238 but it also relied
heavily on Ormsby v. Graham.23 9 The Ormsby case, however, in deal-
ing with a "net" listing which provided that the commission was "to
231. See note 38 supra.
232. 167 Ark. 98, 267 S.W. 577 (1924).
233. Id. at 107, 267 S.W. at 580. The dissent seized upon the "fund" pro-
vision, following a "to make sale" undertaking, and concluded that a completed
sale was required. Compare text supported by note 240 infra.
234. Id. at 105, 267 S.W. at 580.
235. 89 Ark. 289, 116 S.W. 662 (1909).
236. See text supported by notes 170-75 supra.
237. 188 Iowa 395, 174 N.W. 15 (1919), modified on rehearing, 188 Iowa 407,
176 N.W. 275 (1920).
238. 125 Iowa 526, 101 N.W. 271 (1904).
239. 123 Iowa 202, 98 N.W. 724 (1904).
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be retained in full out of the cash payment," had said that, while such
required a "consummated sale," it did "not necessarily [require] a
sale consummated by delivery of deeds of conveyance, but such a
contract as will be enforced by the courts .... ,,o0 Thus, the Ormsby
case, while referring to the "fund" provision as having special rele-
vance in determining the composition of the required act of accept-
ance of the listing owner's offer, indirectly stated that the "cash pay-
ment" would not be essential to recovery of commission.21
This alone would cast doubt upon the authority of the Thompson
opinion, but further confusion exists. The Ormsby opinion relied on
the Minnesota decision in Cremer V. Miller242 for the proposition that
a listing clause providing for payment of brokerage out of the pros-
pective cash payment required a "consummated sale," apparently
overlooking the further statement in the Cremer opinion that,
[I]f the contract required the sale to be consummated, and the
[broker's] ...commission depended upon the payment of the
purchase money, the plaintiff could not recover unless these con-
ditions should exist . . . . "'
Thus, the Crewer decision had clearly indicated that, should the Min-
nesota court be faced with a commission provision making payment of
brokerage dependent upon payment of the contemplated purchase
money, it would adhere to a rationale making the actual existence of
such a "fund" a "condition precedent." Perhaps the Iowa court de-
ciding Oinsby had a premonition of the Minnesota court's later
opinion in the Graves case. -" It is true that the language of the
(e'e',scr opinion had left available, by use of the introductory phrase
"if the contract required," the "time" interpretation later to be em-
ployed in the Graves decision, but there is no indication that the Iowa
court was endowed with such insight.-';
On the other hand, the District of Columbia Court of Municipal
Appeals has shown marked appreciation of conceptual differences
that flow from relatively minor language variations in the listing.
Thus, in Deiblte, v. Grahani ', that court held that a provision in the
contract of sale by which the owner agreed to pay commission "out
of the proceeds" did not constitute a "special agreement to the con-
trary"-did not provide a "condition"-within a Maryland statute
which provided,
240. I1. at 214-15, 98 N.W. at 729.
21, But compare the reliance placed on the Ormsby case by Oregon Home
Bu ilte s v. Montgomery Inv. Co., 94 Ore. 349, 184 Pac. 487 (1919).
212. M inn. 52, 57 N.W. 318 (1893).
241-. 1J. at 55, 57 N.W. at 319.
2.4. See text supported by notes 217-21 svpra.
2,15. The fact that the Iowa court did not refer to the phrase "time of pay-
ment" votuild seem to preclude any possibility that such was present.
246, 62 A.2d 553 (D.C. Mun. App. 1948).
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Whenever, in the absence of a special agreement to the contrary,
a ... broker employed to sell .. procures in good faith a pur-
chaser... and the person... is accepted as such... and enters
into a valid, binding and enforceable written contract . . . the
broker shall be deemed to have earned the ... commission ... 247
But in Dal Maso v. Gregory48 the same court found that a provision
for payment "upon receipt by us of the [deferred payment] due...
thirteen months after the date of settlement" was a "special agree-
ment to the contrary." This for the reason that
The promise to pay.., is directly and grammatically linked with
the receipt by [owners] ... of a specified payment... at a future
specified time .... [To hold that a condition precedent had not
been stated] would require us to ignore the words "upon receipt
by us of the [payment] . . ." and to construe the agreement as
one to pay . . . "thirteen months after date of settlement." This
we cannot do.249
And, finding neither a separate, unqualified promise to pay a definite
amount nor an "acknowledgment" that the commission was owing,
the court concluded that a "condition" had been stated. Thus, the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals has felt that designation of a
"fund" alone did not condition payment of a broker's commission, but
express words relating such payment to the existence of a particular
fund would impose a "condition precedent." This is clearly in accord
with the handling of "when payable" provisions by many discrimi-
nating courts.2 50
"Fund" decisions from still other jurisdictions demonstrate the
tenacity with which the element of fault on the part of the listing
owner grips judicial consideration of such commission provisions.
In three West Virginia cases, 251 for example, the decisional language
clearly adopts the rationale that the broker may complete the required
undertaking but be unable to recover the stated commission because
the "contingency" on which its payment depends has not occurred.
212
Yet the decisions actually involving such agreements are summarized
in Dillon v. Turkey Gap Coal & Coke Co. 253 in language placing an
affirmative duty on the property owner:
247. MD. CODE ANN. art. 2, § 17 (1939).
248. 112 A.2d 923 (D.C. Mun. App. 1955).
249. Id. at 925.
250. Compare text supported by note 30 supra. And, with the discussion of the
California cases at text supported by notes 170-75 supra, as well as with the
textual discussion above, compare Knisely v. Leathe, 178 S.W. 453 (Mo. 1915),
affirming 256 Mo. 341, 166 S.W. 257 (1914), discussed in note 174 supra. Com-
pare Hinds v. Henry, 36 N.J.L. 328 (Sup. Ct. 1873) with Kram v. Losito, 105
N.J.L. 588, 147 Atl. 465 (Ct. Err. & App. 1929) (court found an express recogni-
tion that a commission was owing at the time a "fund" provision was stated).
251. Dillon v. Turkey Gap Coal & Coke Co., 89 W. Va. 395, 109 S.E. 334
(1921); Linton v. Johnson. 81 W. Va. 569, 94 S.E. 945 (1918) ; Hugill v. Weekley,
64 W. Va. 210, 61 S.E. 360 (1908).
252. Compare text supported by note 83 supra.
253. 89 W. Va. 395, 109 S.E. 334 (1921).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1957/iss4/1
EFFECT OF LISTING LANGUAGE
[W]hen a broker has fully performed his contract, he can not
be deprived of his compensation by the failure or refusal of the
seller to enforce the valid and binding contract entered into be-
tween him and the purchaser.!-4
This, of course, is not a statement that it is "immaterial" whose fault
caused defeat of the transaction, as is the case where the "time"
rationale is used,;, but in cases in which the owner has contractually
accepted a purchaser in practical effect the result is the same2uG--a
requirement of affirmative cooperation by the property owner in cases
where the purchaser is originally at fault would seem to circumvent
as effectively the "fraudulent, wilful, or capricious" requirement gen-
erally imposed in cases where a "condition" is stated as would express
adoption of the "time" rationale.: And here we see the West Vir-
ginia court adopting the rationale that payment itself may be con-
ditioned, rather than the "undertaking. - us
We thus see that judicial handling of "fund" provisions parallels
to a high degree that applied in simple "when payable" cases. It
would seem, however, that acceptance of the "condition" rationale in
"fund" cases has a stronger conceptual basis than is present where a
simple "when payable" provision is involved. The decisional basis for
a "condition" interpretation in either case lies in determination of
the parties' intention ' that a named outside event which envisages
receipt of money or its equivalent by the owner must occur before
payment of commission will be exacted. While this is only an infer-
ence when the event named is not stated in terms of monetary receipt,
it seems an obvious conclusion where payment is, by express state-
ment, related to existence of a "fund." That is, where a prospective
fund from which payment is to be made is named, it would seem al-
most axiomatic that its existence would be intended by the palties to
constitute a "condition precedent" to payment of commission, if not
to the broker's undertaking.-," Thus, it would seem that insertion of
such a clause, in the absence of counteracting factors, would more
certainly show that the broker shared the owner's intention. "Coun-
254. IJ. at 398, 109 S.E. at 335.
255. See note 71 supra and text supported thereby. See also Nunn v. Barber,
20 Oki. :a93, 249 P.2d 999 (1952).
Othc'r opinions, such as that in Cheatham v. Yarbrough, 90 Tenn. 77, 15 S.W.
1O76 (1890), read as though the "fund" provisions were unimportant, whereas
in fact the decision turns on the fact that the listing owner caused their failure.
25;. Cf. Knisely v. Leathe, 178 S.W. 453 (Mo. 1915), affirming 256 Mo. 341,
16; S.W. 257 (1914). And see Croak v. Trentman, 50 Okla. 659, 150 Pac. 1088
(1915); Hipple v. Laird, 189 Pa. 472, 42 Atl. 46 (1899).
257,. See text at pp. 310-11 sitpra. Compare the New York handling of this
situation discussed at text supported by notes 107-26 supra. Cf. Bankers' Loan
& Inv. Co. v. Spindle, 108 Va. 426, 62 S.E. 266 (1908).
258. Compare text supported by notes 91-93 supra.
259. Compare text supported by notes 4-5 supra.
2 6. Compare notes 251, 252 supra and text supported thereby.
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teracting factors" which would negative such mutuality of intent are
illustrated by a comparison of the District of Columbia Court of
Municipal Appeals decisions discussed earlier in this section.26
1
4. Terms clearly conditional in import.
Often terms which clearly connote that a named event must occur
before a broker will be entitled to a commission have been employed.21
2
In many such cases the provision for payment of the commission is
simply a part of the "undertaking" clause and thus payment clearly
depends upon the broker's act of acceptance of such offer. For ex-
ample, a promise to pay "if a deal is made" 263 or "if a sale is con-
summated ' 2C4 clearly conditions payment of commission on the se-
curing of a "deal" or "sale. ' '265 Such terms, however, occasionally
appear in a context in which they have reference only to payment of
the commission. We have seen that such is interpreted as the state-
ment of a "condition precedent" by the courts of New Jersey200 and
New York,267 the two states most comprehensively adopting one or
the other of the rationales available. It should come as no surprise,
therefore, to find that judicial treatment, generally, is in accord. 2 8
261. See text supported by notes 246-250 supra.
262. Examples of such are: actually; if; if and when; if, as and when; in
event; only; only if; provided; unless; until; unless and until; or a combination
of such terms..
263. Cornett v. Cunningham, 75 Colo. 220, 225 Pac. 249 (1924).
264. Hoyt v. Wasatch Homes Inc., 1 Utah 2d 9, 261 P.2d 927 (1953).
265. What constitutes a "sale" or "deal" will be treated in a subsequent article.
See note 38 supra.
266. See text supported by notes 47-56 supra.
267. See text supported by notes 94-97 supra.
268. The brokerage provisions most readily considered as stating a "condition"
are those in which terms of the nature of those listed in note 262 supra are
coupled with a "fund" provision or a provision referring directly to payment of
the purchase price. Exemplary of such decisions are: Coulter v. Howard, 203 Cal.
17, 262 Pac. 751 (1927) ("but only out of funds then due and payable"); Davis
v. Chipman, 282 Pac. 992 (Cal. App. 1929) ("if, as and when such purchase price
is received"); Edwards v. Baker, 39 Cal. App. 755, 180 Pac. 33 (1919) ('only
out of the money to be paid"); Van Norman v. Fitchette, 100 Minn. 145, 110
N.W. 851 (1907) ("if payment [made]"); Prideaux v. Plymouth Securities Co.,
231 Mo. App. 1060, 84 S.W.2d 166 (1935) ("out of first payment received");
Hartman v. Selling, 97 Ore. 368, 189 Pac. 887 (1920) ("provided the price is
paid") ; Bush v. Abraham, 25 Ore. 336, 35 Pac. 1066 (1894) ("only when payment
... is actually made"); Matuszewski v. Grisius, 118 Pa. Super. 196, 180 Atl. 130
(1935) ("wait until . . . the purchase money paid"); Branstetter v. Hook, 251
S.W. 257 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) ("only if purchase price paid"); Laird v. Elliott,
219 S.W. 499 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) ("only when . . .purchase money paid");
Crawford v. Woods, 185 S.W. 667 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) ("unless the sale was
actually consummated by payment of the cash consideration"); Parrish v.
Wightman, 184 Va. 86, 34 S.E.2d 229 (1945) ("as, when and if said purchase
price is paid in cash"); Dean v. Wendeberg, 175 Wis. 513, 185 N.W. 514 (1921)
("if [the purchaser] pays [the owner] that part of the purchase price . . . to
be paid on March 1"); cf. West Coast Manufacturer's Agency v. Oregon Con-
densed Milk Co., 54 Wash. 247, 103 Pac. 4 (1909) ("actually paid for"). Contra,
Kirchoff v. Cummard, 26 Ariz. 512, 226 Pac. 1092 (1924).
Other provisions which, when coupled with "clearly conditional" terms, are
obviously intended to insure the listing owner's receipt of a fund from which
payment of the commission may be made, include:
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(b) Obligation of a Listing Property Owner
The method used in the handling of problems falling within the
area of this heading have been discussed in connection with presen-
tation of the "time" ' and "condition" 27° rationales and will not be
redeveloped here. To those discussions, however, must be added the
methodology utilized by a few courts in which an obligation of affirm-
affe cooperation to secure occurrence of the outside event, on which
payment is conditioned, is cast upon a listing property owner who
has contractually accepted a purchaser procured by a broker.5 71 De-
pending upon the rationale adopted in the specific case, whether
"time" or "condition precedent," the judicial attitude of the remain-
ing jurisdictions closely parallels the pertinent specific discussions
to which reference has been made above.
V. NON-BROKERAGE ANALOGIES
Decisions rendered in analogous situations have found the courts
in general less dogmatic about the effect of particular "payment"
language, although the same general interpretation criteria are em-
ployed. That is, "the intention of the parties to make the debt con-
tingent or otherwise, must be gathered from the language used, the
situation of the parties, and the subject matter of the contract....
(a) "settlement": Clark v. Provident Trust Co., 329 Pal 421 198 Atl 36
Mn>'8) ("only when settlement was made"); Swotes v. Schneider, 129 Pa. Super.
214, 19,- AtC.464 (1937) ("in the event of settlement"); Rottner v. Alencoff, 71
Pa, 1. & C, 484 (1950) ("as, if and when settlement hereunder shall be completed
onh") ;
(1) "consunmmated": University Realty Co. v. Neylan, 49 Cal. App. 2d 221,
1211 P2J 500 (1942) ("in the event . ..the purchase . ..was consummated");
C,,nor v. Riggins, 21 Cal. App. 756, 132 Pac. 849 (1913) ("in event consum-
mated"); Kay v. Sperling, 83 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 1956) ("unless and until a deal
% eorvrumimated"); Morgan v. Wheeler, 150 Kan. 667, 95 P.2d 320 (1939) ("ac-
tually be consummated"); Baum v. Goldblatt, 81 Pa. Super. 233 (1923) ("when
aid if the same is consummated"); ef. Denbo v. Weston Inv. Co., 112 Cal. App.
2d 15:, 245 P.2d 650 (1952) ("provided [commission] to be... paid only when,
a. knd iW [an option is exercised]");
(e) "completion": Chapman v.A Winson, 20 T.L.R. 663 (C.A. 1904) ("when
ad if tie purchase is completed"); Fower v. Davidson, 44 Minn. 46, 46 N.W.
3o8 (I 890) ("pay . . . on the completion of the transfer"); cf. Cochran v. Ells-
wtih, 1,2; Cal. App. 2d 429, 272 P.2d 904 (1954) ("In event of consummation
COMIem1ission ... payable . . . at the clo;e of escrow") ;
(od) "papers" are "passed": Spritz v. Brockton Say. Bank, 305 Mass. 170, 25
N.&12,1 155 (1940) ("only if, as and when all papers . .. shall actually be
passed. "); Ivas v. Galligan, 271 Mass. 410, 171 N.E. 654 (1930) ("unless and
until dcc d shall be actually delivered.., and accepted"); Goldman v. Eisenberg,
! ; a4, 56r, 152 N.E. 879 (1926) ("fand when papers are passed"--Rosen-
thal v. Schwvartz, 214 Mass. 371, 101 N.E. 1070 (1913) expressly distinguished;
mfm ot': 217 sepi)f;
(c) "hial accounting": Canner v. Cohen, 329 'Mass. 536, 109 N.E.2d 138 (1952)
("uprm i-inl account").
269. See § II (b) serprao
270. See tert at notes 105-18 s ,pra, Note, Special Conditions in Real Estate
Brdw 'qc Corztraets, 32 COLUM . L. REV. 1194, 1197-1204 (1932).
2171. See text supported by notes 251-57 supra.
272. North American Graphite Corp. v. Allan, 184 F.2d 387, 390 (D.C. Cir.
1950).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
Thus, in the decision from which the above quotation was taken, the
speculative nature of the undertaking (rehabilitation of a graphite
mine) and the fact that a "condition" holding would require a deter-
mination that the plaintiff had intended to accept the same compen-
sation on a contingent basis as he was to receive on a regular basis75
combined to persuade the court that "only the time of liability was
contingent, not the liability itself."
California decisions further illustrate the importance of the word-
ing used and the context in which it was enunciated. We have already
seen the considerations indulged in by that court in brokerage cases.2714
The same factors find expression in other cases. Thus, the language
of a promissory note coupled with a consideration of the circum-
stances which produced it led to the conclusion that the obligation
evidenced by the note was not conditional-that only the time of
payment was uncertain.275 And, where a debt is acknowledged due,
a reference to an outside event has been considered as designating
only the time of payment.2 76 On the other hand, designation of a
"fund" normally results in the finding of a "condition precedent.27
Although decisions involving other payment provisions would suf-
fice, 2 78 the handling of "fund" provisions provides the most pointed
example of the less dogmatic approach in non-brokerage mercantile
cases. Thus, in William F. Mosser Co. v. Cherry River Boom & Lum-
ber Co.,2 79 the Pennsylvania court found that where the circumstances
are such as to show an absolute obligation to pay, even the designa-
tion of a "fund" from which payment is to be made will not make
payment conditional. It is not in the particular holding per se that
the significant difference from the brokerage cases lies, however.
Rather, the significant difference lies in the comparative ease with
which a "fund" provision may be considered as merely providing the
"time" of payment.280
The apparent greater willingness of the courts to find "time" in
273. The plaintiff, an engineer, had been employed originally under a contract
which provided for compensation "when the mill is ready for operation," whereas
an amended provision-the pertinent provision in question-provided for payment
"as soon as the plant is in successful operation."
274. See text supported by notes 171-76 supra.
275. Bank of America Nat'l Trust and Savings Ass'n v. Engleman, 101 Cal.
App. 2d 390, 225 P.2d 597 (1950). See also Morrison v. Sycamore Canyon Gravel
Co., 102 Cal. App. 536, 283 Pac. 84 (1929); of. Easom v. General Mortgage Co.,
101 Cal. App. 186, 281 Pac. 514 (1929).
276. Cf. McNeal v. Foreman, 117 Cal. App. 155, 3 P.2d 583 (1931). But see
In re Lynch, 163 Cal. 690, 126 Pac. 968 (1912).
277. Carpenter v. Elmer R. Sly Co., 109 Cal. App. 539, 293 Pac. 162 (1930).
See also In re Lynch, supra note 276; Hodgdon v. Peet, 122 Minn. 286, 142 N.W.
808 (1913).
278. See, e.g., Easom v. General Mortgage Co., 101 Cal. App. 186, 281 Pac.
514 (1929); Sanford v. Luce, 245 Iowa 74, 60 N.W.2d 885 (1953).
279. 290 Pa. 67, 138 Atl. 85 (1927).
280. See subdivision III (a) 3, supra.
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analogous business decisions raises interesting considerations. In
such a case the opposing parties may well be equal in intellect and
experience. In brokerage cases they likely will not be. Is this to some
extent responsible for the "condition" preference of most courts in
brokerage cases? That is, do the courts accepting the "condition"
preference feel that by so doing they are helping to protect the "com-
mon man" by offsetting the broker's experience advantage? Lacking
equipment with which to read men's thoughts, these questions must
remain unanswered. We can, however, appreciate the effect of a
particular preference and of the strength with which it is applied.
VI. CONCLUSION
Proper judicial handling of brokerage agreements containing pro-
vision for payment of commission of the type herein discussed re-
quires first a determination of the temporal sequence of events-when
was the agreement first enunciated? If the answer is "preliminary to
action by the broker," direct reference must be made to the language
utilized by the parties to memorialize their agreement. Where such
language consists of a clause introduced by one of the terms by which
section 1 of the "General" division of this paper is introduced,21 fol-
lowed by designation of an outside event when payment is to be made,
most courts have utilized the underlying rationale of Amies v. Wes-
nofske in holding that occurrence of the event is essential to maturing
of a claim for commission.282 In so doing, these courts are, for the
most part, treating the commission clause as a part of the "under-
taking." That is, the broker is considered as having been employed
not simply to "find a purchaser" or "secure a sale" as the "under-
taking":-s' clause may provide, but to find a purchaser or secure a sale
and procure occurrence of the outside event. Other opinions, while
in one sense separating the "undertaking" and "payment" clauses,
have reached the same result by holding that, although a broker has
performed his required "undertaking," payment of his commission is
conditioned on occurrence of the outside event.2s4 Still others have
followed the lead of New Jersey and have largely searched for, and
readily found, a "separate, unqualified promise" to pay a commission.
281. While Professor Williston's treatise on Contracts provides one basis for
a "condition" interpretation, it would seem that the extreme end to which his
statement has been put is unwarranted. Compare note 153 supra.
282. Although the Amies case involved a commission agreement entered sub-
sequent to rendition of services by a broker, the terms of a listing entered prior
to such rendition were considered as controlling. See text supported by notes 287-
89 infra.
283. It is believed that breaking the commission agreement into two distinct
segments, "undertaking" and "payment," leads to a clearer understanding of the
problems involved, and helps to illustrate what the majority "condition" courts
are in fact doing.
284. See text supported by notes 83-85 supra.
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Thus they have removed the major foundation supporting the "con-
dition precedent" rationale-the "oneness" of the employment and
payment clauses. However, it would seem clear that, although a
separate promise to pay is present, if it is "qualified" a proper in-
terpretation would follow the "additional condition" rationale.2 18 The
conclusion would thus be reached that, although the broker has per-
formed his "undertaking," payment is conditioned. Here, again, in
determining whether the payment provision is or is not subject to a
condition precedent, the "time" or "condition" disposition of the court
will be largely determinative.
It has been easy to demonstrate how the "condition" rationale has
been overdone. But, just as a strict "condition" rationale jeopardizes
accurate determination of the contract intention, overindulgence of
the "time" interpretation may lead a court to conclude, as was in fact
expressly acknowledged by the New Jersey court,28a that notwith-
standing the presence of an attempt to make the payment of commis-
sions conditional on the occurrence of a named outside event, a "time"
rationale is the appropriate analytical tool to be employed. It seems
obvious that where such interpretation is adopted the true contiact
intention is jeopardized as severely as is the case where the "condi-
tion" interpretation holds the sole key to brokerage litigation concern-
ing such terms. Although neither New York nor New Jersey has
adopted one approach to the complete exclusion of the other, accept-
able justification of the degree in which each court's preference has
exerted itself seems impossible. Inasmuch as the primary goal of
contract interpretation is ascertainment of the intention of the par-
ties, interpretation that looks for a separate unqualified promise to
pay appears to be vastly preferable to either "absolute." With moder-
ate application, such an interpretation would seem to offer sufficient
promise of truly reconciling the conflicting intentions of the property
owner and broker to overcome the administrative convenience present
in a semi-automatic application of either absolute.
In situations where the broker has rendered his services before
the commission provision has been executed, other considerations
come into play. In such a case, many courts, including those of New
Jersey, give primary emphasis to the existence or non-existence of an
"acknowledgment"; New York courts emphasize the "consideration"
factor; while other "condition" courts seem unaware of the conceptual
difference between a pre-activity and a post-activity agreement. Un-
derlying these latter decisions is the canon "construe against the
maker." In many situations search for an acknowledgment will
285. See text supported by note 93 supra.
286. Forman v. Bedminster Land Co., 110 N.J.L. 1, 163 AtI. 123 (Sup. Ct.
1932).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1957/iss4/1
EFFECT OF LISTING LANGUAGE
prompt the same result as search for consideration-the finding of an
acknowledgment will be treated as the equivalent- of finding a lack
of consideration.-ss In fact, the two criteria may well be combined.
For example, in Andes v. Wesnofske the New York Court of Appeals
clearly found that the broker's required act of acceptance was pre-
scribed by the terms of an original listing because there was an "ac-
knowledgment of a prior employment of [the brokers] to render ser-
vices already performed," and without more there would be no con-
sideration for a new brokerage provision. But once this step is taken,
the difference between an acknowledgment of prior employment and
an acknowledgment that commission has been earned becomes crucial.
It is in the eagerness of a particular court to find that there is an
acknowledgment that commission has been earned that one key to
a time disposition will be found. If the court finds only an acknowl-
edgment of prior employment, it seems obvious that resort to the
terms of such prior employment is called for, which in turn leads to
determination of the legal effect of the terms there employed. This
was the methodology followed in the Amies opinion. And if an ex-
press acknowledgment that commission has been earned is found,
nearly all courts would find that the broker could not be defeated in
his caim by reference to the provisions of the subsequent agree-
ment.-'- However, the broker having agreed to wait for payment of
his commission until the happening of some outside event, it would
seem perfectly proper to give effect to the subsequent agreement as
a statement of the "time" at which payment would be made. Such
consideration would, in most instances, protect the owner by providing
him with the necessary finances with which to make payment. At the
same time, there would be little likelihood of any real prejudice to
287. Put consider the situation in which a mere volunteer introduces a pur-
chaser to a property owner after which a commission agreement employing a
clause i'eferring to an outside event is executed. On these simple facts, the agree-
nment would be supported by consideration and most courts would probably hold
that a "condition precedent" had been stated. And, such a result would probably
be forthcoming from a New York court in a case where the commission agree-
ment also contained an acknowledgment that the volunteer had earned a com-
mission. On the other hand, a court placing emphasis on the acknowledgment
factor x ould likely find that the "outside event" clause served only to postpone
the "time" of pay-ent of a commission which had already been earned.
288. E.g., wit, cases cited at note 106 sep'a, compure text supported by note
28t. Bit cf. Lan-,ford v. King Lumber & Mfg. Co., 123 Fia. 855, 167 So. 817(Vt35)r; Ballas v. Lake WVeir Light & Water Co., 100 FIn. 913, 130 So. 421(Ic0;Hinds v. Henry,:A6 N.J.L. 328 (Sup. Ct. 1873); Nekarda v. Presberger,
121 Aplo. Div. 418, 107 N.Y. Supp. 897 (1st Dep't 1908).
Could it be that the contrary holding in Hinds v. Henry, supra, became the
unpalatable pill leading to the sweet tasting "time" rationale adopted by the
New Jersey courts? See text supported by notes 28-29 supra. Or, are the Hinds,
N, k,',od,,, and Ehillas cases actually further examples of the strong "condition"
influence of the statement of a "fund" from which payment is to be made, and
thv Lanaqford opinion clearly explainable in terms of pleading problems? Compare
text supported by note 250 ;zipra.
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the broker. On the other hand, an acknowledgment that services
have been performed, standing alone, neither clearly connotes that
there had been prior employment nor that a commission had been
earned. In fact, such terms are often found where the "broker" had
been a mere volunteer, in which case there would clearly be no ac-
knowledgment of prior employment. Could it be interpreted as an
acknowledgment of commission earned? Only the most eager court
would so find. But suppose, in the words of the Amies court, there
is an acknowledgment of prior employment to render the services
which have already been perfdrmed? It seems obvious that such
could, contrary to the Amies opinion, but with straight face, be con-
sidered the equivalent of "commission earned"V-provision effective
to state "time" only.
Thus, the variation in language employed in the "acknowledgment"
clause may (1) be determinative of the result, as where there is an
express acknowledgment of commission earned; (2) throw an in-
terpreter back to the terms of an earlier listing (with the attendant
interpretive problems presented by "pre-activity" situations) ; or (3)
present a situation where the underlying "time" or "condition" com-
plexion of the court will determine the result.
However, cases often arise in which there is neither an express
acknowledgment nor an expression which a court with a "time" dis-
position can interpret as such. Where such is the case, most courts,
whether classified as "time" or "condition," have found that a com-
mission provision referring to an outside event, executed simultane-
ously with or subsequent to the broker's rendition of the contemplated
services, presents a condition precedent to payment. If the broker
was originally a volunteer such a decision seems proper. But where
there had been previous employment a serious question of the exis-
tence of consideration to support the imposition of the later enunci-
ated condition arises. Inasmuch as most courts outside New York
omit any reference to such problem, it would seem that lack of ac-
knowledgment is silently considered to negate any problem of lack of
consideration.2 0
Emphasis has so far been placed on considerations dealing with
matters directly bearing on the commission provision. But proper
consideration of its effect cannot be divorced from the entire factual
situation in which the provision was enunciated-what had transpired
earlier and what was the immediate goal to which the provision was
directed? And how will the one interpretation or the other bear upon
its realization and on the community? It is believed that these and
analogous questions, which have already been raised in an attempt to
show the considerations which must be pursued by lawyers and courts
290. Compare text supported by notes 141-49 supra.
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when called upon to decide a brokerage conflict,2'1 adequately illustrate
the total area to be considered. These are the questions and considera-
tions which find expression in analogous cases, although the results
reached in such cases seem more favorable to the promisee than is
true in cases where the promisee is a broker.2-
The foregoing discussion has rested on the assumption that the
effect of the payment provision actually employed is a matter for
court determination. While the actual interpretation is a question of
fact, most courts make the final interpretation "as a matter of law"
where terms of the character herein discussed have been employed.203
In so handling the matter, substantial consistency is obtained within
a given jurisdiction. Normally this is desirable. But where "con-
sistency" results in decisions that as a practical matter do violence to
the intention of the parties, just cause to question the desirability of
consistency for consistency's sake is presented. Or, should there be a
challenge aimed at whether true consistency is in fact achieved in
such manner? Is it truly consistent to treat a simple "when payable"
clause in the same manner as a clause designating a "fund" from
which payment is to be made? -"1
It remains to point out the important considerations which exist
concerning the obligation of a listing property owner to his broker in
a court where a "time" rather than a "condition" interpretation is
preferred. Such considerations assume major prominence where the
named event has failed to occur only if the happening of that event is
held to constitute a "condition precedent." That is, if a "time" court
is presented with a brokerage claim based upon a commission pro-
vision to which such court applies a "condition" label, it will employ
an interpretation substantially similar to, if not identical with, the
"active-passive" dichotomy applied by most "condition" courts. As a
result, if the properth owner has remained passive in the defeat of a
transaction, failure of the "condition precedent" will cause defeat of
a broker's action. On the other hand, if the outside event is looked
upon as merely designating a "time" at which a commission is to be
paid, it is immaterial whose fault, the owner's or the purchaser's,
caused defeat of the transaction-the commission will be considered
as earned when the act of acceptance required of the broker by the
"undertaking" clause has been performed, and payable when the date
set for occurrence of the outside event has passed.
291. See text at pp. 307-10 s~ipra.
S2. gee V sitj r.
293. This is true even though some ambiguity is considered to be present and
pal ol evidence has been admitted to aid in resolving such. If "serious" am-
higity -,is foxrn to exist, k 1ury qaestion is presented. See note $2 MPra and text
supported by notes 152, 198-206 supra.
294. See text supported by notes 259-61 stpnra.
Such criticism of the interpretation employed, however, is not to be taken as
criticism of the court as the proper agency to undertake the interpretation.
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